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# West Europe Report

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## DEBATE ON WEST EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DEFENSE ISSUES CONTINUES

## Paradoxes in U. S. Relationship

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Claude Julien]

[Text] The end of a reign is always fraught with dangers. The risk increases when each of the two superpowers--for different reasons, to be sure, but simultaneously--experiences an uncertainty of power. Now, while Moscow and Washington are wondering what policy the successors to Brezhnev and Carter will follow, the world's image continues to be out of focus. The USSR and the United States see difficulties mounting, as witnessed on the one hand by the economic reform promulgated last July by the Soviets and on the other by the recession signaled by all the American indices. Each of the two giants feels less certain of his allies; each one uneasily observes the tensions prevailing in the danger zones: the Eastern Mediterranean, Afghanistan, Iran, Southeast Asia, Southern Africa, Central America --comprising so many sources of explosion with consequences that are hard to foresee and even harder to control.

Officially, in spite of everything, the two camps are clinging to "doctrines" which, as everyone is quite aware, are at the mercy of profound changes on the world scene and change in the teams in power. Thus, the course of "detente" is being openly contested in certain American political circles whom it would be going too far to characterize merely as longing for a return to the Cold War. Yet who can claim to know the thoughts of the rising generation in the USSR?

In this atmosphere of uncertainty, Europe is asking itself questions, not without reason but with timidity. It knows that its security is threatened both economically and militarily. On these two levels, its margin for maneuvering continues to be narrow; despite consultations that are often being pursued with less energy than people care to admit, its powerful ally is moving toward choices--on energy, trade, money, strategy--or is giving evidence of hesitations that raise doubts about the future of the Old Continent, but the latter is not succeeding in acting cohesively to find a path suited to its own interests.

The European governments would be more clear-sighted if they drew all of the consequences of a single major fact: Washington's foreign policy is no longer reflective of the practice of bipartisanship that was constant since the end of the war, a practice that is an indispensable basis for a policy of deterrence that exposes the country to the adversary's reprisals. In May 1978, the Republicans clearly marked the turning point by denouncing the "15 months of incoherence, inconsistency and ineptitude" which to their way of thinking have obscured the great national objectives. That fact is serious enough that the two quarterly reviews FOREIGN AFFAIRS and FOREIGN POLICY, in their issues this summer, wonder what means can be used to regain the confidence of both American opinion and that of the European allies.

But there is even more to this. The bipartisanship actually was based on an illusion that has not borne up well against Mr Carter's vacillations and the change in the ratio of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. De Gaulle saw clearly where that illusion lay: it was at the very least paradoxical, as FOREIGN AFFAIRS now admits, to build Europe's defense on the risks that the United States would take even though its own national territory would not be attacked. "All that one can do," adds the review, "is make shift with this paradox."

What a reassuring prospect, all the more so because on 1 September, Mr Henry Kissinger admitted publicly in Brussels that it is "absurd to base the West's strategy on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide," the very essence of deterrence. Considerably damaged today, that credibility was no greater when the United States had a clear strategic superiority: why would it therefore have exposed its own cities to attack? And yet, as he acknowledges now, Mr Kissinger often "reassured" the Allies by lavishing on them the "magic words" that exalted the firm determination of the United States. He now doubts that his country can or wants to keep its promises, because "if we keep them, we risk the destruction of civilisation." And, with the cynicism that so many naive or interested observers have hesitated to see in him, he adds: "I would not be saying that if I were in power."

It is good to have allies. It is even wiser to rely first of all on oneself. By definition, a defense cannot be put in the hands of others, no matter how friendly they are.

#### Communist Viewpoint

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 12 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by PCF Central Committee member Rene Andrieu]

[Text] An orchestrated campaign or a chance meeting? In any case, what is certain is that at the present time, we are seeing a series of varied initiatives being put forth in all the Western capitals in a common environment: in principle, all of them presuppose the absolute principle of accelerating the arms race.

Yesterday, the French government made a document public in which it reaffirms its intention to increase the military budget's proportion of public expenditures. The reason given is that the ratio of forces between the alliance systems of the West and East "continues to deteriorate to the detriment of the Western countries, both in the areas of nuclear armaments and conventional forces.

To be sure, this document notes that the building of Europe "continues not to involve questions of defense," but one may wonder whether that is not in fact a regret, in view of the statement made by Mr Bourges that the defense of Europe represented one of the essential missions of the French armed forces.

For its part, the bureau of the European Assembly, under the presidency of Mme Veil, decided the day before last to place a question concerning the defense of Europe on the agenda. That would in itself suffice to show how right we were when we denounced the projects of those who want to expand the Assembly's powers.

Recalling the repeated stands taken by General Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti in favor of Franco-German cooperation in the field of nuclear armament, we note that there is also a bunch of official or semi-official statements tending toward the same objective.

An extensive press campaign supports that undertaking, as witness notably the lamentable publicity given by LE MONDE to the unleashing of World War III by the Soviets and the editorial by J.F. Revel in L'EXPRESS evoking the Soviet "threat" with the latest arguments uttered by the Pentagon. This campaign goes beyond our country's borders, as shown by the play being given by American official circles and their honorable correspondents here and there all over the world to the discovery 17 years late of the existence of Soviet military experts in Cuba. In the United States, President Carter has decided to install a new system of nuclear missiles with multiple warheads, while in Bonn the government has just published a white paper anticipating a considerable strengthening in the next 10 years of the armament of the Bundeswehr, already considered to be the most powerful conventional army in Europe.

Naturally, those who preach this new crusade justify their position by evoking the existence of a threat by the USSR that, according to them, is due to the fact that it has a military superiority in atomic and conventional weapons. As they would have some difficulty in furnishing the slightest example of any aggression or aggressiveness on the part of the Soviet Union, they do not hesitate to invent one, which accounts for the anticipatory report by LE MONDE. They are doubtless hoping to create a climate favorable for justifying the arms race.

In the case of France, it certainly appears that the main purpose of the campaign underway is to push the idea that the French deterrent force has lost its "credibility," that the concept of national defense is out-of-date and that it is necessary to establish an integrated nuclear armament on the European level.

In short, it is a program which for certain persons would have the virtue of allying the national resignation with the crusade against the USSR. Such a policy is fraught with danger. It is not in an arms race or in the consolidation of military blocs that the safety of France and the world lies, but rather in the patient search for detente and peace.

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CSO: 3100

REVIEW OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 28 Sep 79 p 10

[Article by Laurent Sauerwein: "The Europe of the Wreckers"]

[Text] Strasbourg, 27 September--They talked about the Europe of peace during the whole election campaign, but it is the Europe of arms they want to organize; that was made plain in Tuesday's debate. They talked about building Europe, but they are demolishing it, spreading inequality, austerity and waste. The debates on agriculture, energy or the EEC budget confirmed this. They talked about independence and freedoms, but all the means and all the claims go toward pushing democracy into supranationality and eroding democracy. This is evidenced, among other things, by their desire to impose a European judicial space.

With regard to all these grave questions being raised in the European Assembly, in the midst of what should now be called "chaos-Europe," the French Communist deputies and their allies urged that clear language be maintained--the language of the struggle for national independence and a true cooperation.

Thus, Francis Wurtz and Felix Damette on Wednesday, on energy problems. The former disputed the validity of the tendency to invoke oil to explain the crisis and inflation. He emphasized that France's petroleum bill in 1970 should represent the same share of the gross national product as it did three years ago--3.75 percent. The energy problem will only be solved by having a broad national policy in that area, by establishing equitable cooperation between sovereign nations and a new world economic order.

Felix Damette stood up vigorously against a plan of the Brussels Commission aimed at having France pay for the accelerated liquidation of its coal mines. This plan recommends establishing true "compensatory amounts" for coal, following the example of what is being done for agricultural products. That is, West German coal sold in France will be subsidized by the Community and will cost much less than French coal, while the shafts in the north, east and center of France will continue to be liquidated.

According to this plan France would pay 120,000,000 to 150,000,000 current francs to German konzerns [companies], to permit them to occupy the French coal market.

"This is absolutely scandalous," Felix Damette declared. All the more so because the French PS [Socialist Party] has pledged, with all the rightist political groups, to accelerate these measures. "A stab in the back for the French Coal Board," the ruin of entire regions and a senseless waste. There is only one answer: to fight. It will have the Communists' total support.

The wreckers are affecting everything; they also want to get rid of thousands of agricultural developments and ruin the sheep raisers, about whom there was a question on Thursday, a propos of the sheep regulation now in preparation.

Demonstrations by French sheep raisers, such as the one that just brought 20,000 of them together in Rodez, testify to the profound anxiety and anger aroused by this project, which is at once antisocial and anti-economy.

French sheep production is being competed with by the influx from New Zealand, passing through the United Kingdom, to the profit of a handful of British-capitalized multinationals that are monopolizing 80 percent of the world's sheep trade. The proposed regulation will permit an even more appreciable increase in these importations from New Zealand--a real invasion of the French market, the most important in the EEC, and the ruin of our country's sheep raisers.

The European Community budget for 1980, as estimated, is also going to increase the inequities still more. Louis Baillot brought the matter up. It is designed to finance the continuance of the rebuilding of industry and agriculture to the profit of the trusts that dominate those sectors.

"In this Assembly we are firmly opposed to anything that may facilitate the waste of equipment and drive men to despair; that is the mandate we have been given by our people," Louis Baillot emphasized.

The French Communists and their allies, as Robert Chambeiron recalled, are also opposed to any attempt to restrict freedoms.

Robert Chambeiron said he believed that the fight against terrorism--which we firmly and unequivocally condemn--too often serves as a pretext for putting democratic freedoms and fundamental rights into question. "In our opinion," he added, "this involves above all a strengthening of democracy and a development of public freedoms."

After citing numerous current examples of attacks on freedoms, Robert Chambeiron brought up the gravity of recent decisions aimed at establishing a European judicial space.

"It is obvious that to the extent that justice was standardized, subjected to supranational standards, it would quickly be cut off from the necessary and indispensable democratic control," he concluded.

The Communist deputies and their French and Italian allies filed a draft resolution asking the European Assembly to support "the right to self-determination and independence of the Saharan people within the borders resulting from colonization," and recognition of the POLISARIO Front as the sole representative of that people.

They are also asking for the withdrawal of all Moroccan troops.

In a proposal signed notably by Emilio Colombo, Leo Tindemans, former Belgian prime minister, Egon Klepsche (FRG) and Maurice-Rene Simonet (a follower of Mr Lecanuet, elected on Madame Veil's list), the parliamentary group of European Christian Democrats yesterday suggested in Strasbourg that the new European Assembly take initiatives to supplement the present Community treaties with a new treaty. The new treaty, the proposal clearly states, should grant new powers to the Strasbourg Assembly.

A Hit!

Georges Marchais' speech in the European Assembly caused a certain amount of agitation in the West German capital. The Bonn government hastened to deny that it has any desire whatsoever to equip itself with the nuclear weapon. In a communique published on Thursday by the chancellor's press department, the government recalls that the FRG in 1954 gave up manufacturing atomic missiles, and that official statements are "clear and unequivocal." The successive denials from Bonn are so far from being convincing that the plans for rehashing a new ECD and sharing the French strike force with the FRG are being examined with the utmost seriousness by the administrative staffs of both countries. At one time, there had been some question of deploying Pluto rockets with nuclear warheads, and the problem--despite the "denials"--was studied at governmental level. On the other hand, the Christian Democratic leaders who are not giving up providing relief to the Bonn chancellery, have never made any mystery of their nuclear ambitions.

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CSO: 3100

## EGYPTIAN PRIME MINISTER KHALIL ENDS VISIT

Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 25 Oct 79 p 2 AU

[Summary] Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil who had been in Salzburg since 18 October, left by special plane from Salzburg-Maxglan airport for London on 24 October. Khalil, who, after information talks with Chancellor Kreisky, held intensive bilateral economic negotiations this week, was seen off by Salzburg Governor Wilfried Haslauer. On his departure, Khalil sent Chancellor Kreisky a telegram thanking him and the Austrian people for their hospitality and conveying best wishes for prosperity and well-being. The telegram said among other things: "I also thank you very much for your sincere efforts to bring about a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East."

According to a statement issued on the visit, Khalil declared in Salzburg that Egypt was primarily interested in Palestinian participation in the current autonomy talks as well as in all future negotiations on their right to self-determination.

"The statement goes on to say that Dr Khalil particularly praised the policy of the Austrian chancellor and his positive attitude toward Palestinian participation in all forthcoming negotiations concerning their future. Khalil stressed that Dr Kreisky enjoys great respect and high esteem on the part of President Al-Sadat and among the Egyptian people in general."

In the economic talks Austrian Government agencies and Austrian and European firms declared their readiness to participate in implementation of large projects under the Egyptian 5-year plan, 1980-1984. They are essentially construction and power projects including the construction of storage facilities and hospitals. The talks with business representatives were mostly chaired by Khalil personally. Their purpose was to promote introduction of modern technology into the Egyptian economy within the framework of the country's new, liberal economic policy, and to stimulate practical cooperation with friendly countries in Egypt's economic and social development. The cost of the envisaged projects is about 40 billion schillings in the electricity sector, about 30 billion schillings in the housing construction sector, and about 20 billion schillings in the agricultural sector.

## BRIEFS

BELGRADE TRADE TALKS--Austrian Trade Minister Staribacher declared on 22 October that the Yugoslav side at last week's trade talks in Belgrade complained about inadequate opportunities for exporting to Austria and especially about Austrian customs barriers and other trade obstacles. According to Staribacher, Yugoslavia wants to overcome these obstacles with the aid of industrial cooperation projects, regional trade agreements and tariff privileges. Yugoslavia's deficit in trade with Austria was 4.5 billion schillings in 1978 and amounted to 3.6 billion schillings in the first 8 months of this year although exports to Austria in this period went up 20 percent. Austria is interested in importing large quantities of Yugoslav coal on a long-term basis, and in the participation by Austrian firms in the development of Yugoslav coal mines, Staribacher said. He declared that a joint experts group will study all possibilities for promoting Yugoslav exports to Austria, but added that it would also be up to Yugoslav enterprises to be more active in the Austrian market, which is open to everyone. [Vienna ARBEITER-ZEITUNG in German 23 Oct 79 p 13 AU]

OFFICIAL VISITS BELGIUM--On 23 October Foreign Minister Dr Willibald Pahr left by air for a 2-day official visit to Belgium. He will have working talks with his Belgian counterpart, Henry Simonet, call on King Baudouin, and visit an industrial enterprise and an exhibition in Brussels. Before his departure, Pahr declared that there are no bilateral problems between Austria and Belgium and that he therefore would concentrate on multi-lateral problems between Austria and the EEC in his talks with Simonet. In addition to the question of improving the bilateral trade relations, the two ministers will discuss important international problems including the Middle East question, the Madrid CSCE follow-up conference and the pending proposals for disarmament in Europe. In the evening of 25 October, after the end of his official visit, Foreign Minister Pahr will go to Brugge on an unofficial visit, where he will deliver a lecture on the subject "Detente in Europe" at the "College d'Europe" on 26 October. [Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 24 Oct 79 p 2 AU]

CSO: 3103

**BREZHNEV PROPOSALS SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY**

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 26 Oct 79 p 3 DW

[Article signed HLG: "Hint From Moscow"]

[Text] The announcement made by the Soviet leader about withdrawing 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks from the GDR has left many questions open. One important question has been answered now by Defense Minister Ustinov who said that the soldiers and the military equipment would be taken back to Soviet territory. A transfer of these contingents a few kilometers behind the Oder, in fact, would have been worth nothing even as a gesture of good will. After that has been made clear by Ustinov this can be but a beginning in an effort to bring both the conventional and the nuclear balance in Europe down to a lower level.

But Ustinov's message, which was connected with the usual threats, also indicates that the Soviet Union is prepared to seriously open the great dialog. At any rate, it would be more than careless to underrate or even ignore this initial move from Moscow. True, officially the West is prepared to resume the dialog; after all, it has urged the USSR time and again to this effect.

But at the same time, influential security fanatics are making statements once again seeking salvation in a stepped-up armament. There is much talk again of siren songs from Moscow, the attempt of the Soviet Union to separate the Federal Republic from the alliance and other terrible things. Those who recommend that efforts be undertaken without further ado to find out what the Soviets could contribute to prevent a new round of the arms race are promptly suspected of being "pacifists" at least, if not worse.

The danger is great that a venture which is as difficult as it is reasonable is talked to pieces before it has really begun. Therefore it could not be early enough to start making inquiries, as the U.S. Government has just done.

CSO: 3103

## COMMENTATOR STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF NEW NATO ARMS

Bonn DIE WELT in German 26 Oct 79 p 5 DW

[Article by C. Graf Brockdorff: "Without New Nuclear Arms NATO's Strategy Will Become a Torso"]

[Text] The secret of the Western alliance's success is the "flexible re-action" strategy. It aims at safeguarding peace through deterrence and to rule out political blackmailing with military means.

"Flexible response," which is the official term for this strategy, is kept purposefull impenetrable. It says that in case of an attack on the West NATO will hit back with the appropriate means. No scenario is imaginable or implementable that would clearly show the adversary how the West would react in a certain situation. Will it possibly react with nuclear arms when its reconnaissance units--the tactical eyes of NATO--have been destroyed with conventional arms? Nobody knows that. Neither NATO nor the Soviets. The NATO leadership will decide on the spot in a flexible way. This risk of an attack remains unpredictable.

Such a strategy will function only if certain prerequisites have been fulfilled. The potential adversary--particularly its military men--must be convinced that NATO has the means to fulfill the prerequisite. There is something wrong with this. The Western alliance faces the situation where intercontinental strategic arms offset each other, while very accurate new Soviet medium-range nuclear arms systems have created an unstable situation in Europe.

These arms permit the Soviets to destroy in a "selected" way certain targets in Western Europe. It means that Moscow would be in a position to wage a limited nuclear war and destroy military targets in Western Europe without creating unacceptable civilian damage.

NATO has no means to point out clearly the risks in this field. It has no medium-range systems that fire accurately. In such a case it would have to decide to destroy whole cities in the Soviet Union. That would presuppose, however, that an enormous escalation step would be taken and an intercontinental world war of total destruction touched off.

Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was the first to say that this threat does not work, that it lacks credibility and is therefore useless; he said so publicly in 1977 at a meeting in London. The words Schmidt used were very careful but clear enough. He meant the following: The West is running the risk of voluntarily renouncing one escalation step, and that could threaten peace.

The gap in the instruments of Western strategy results from the absence of nuclear arms systems with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers. Under that 1,000 kilometer level NATO is amply equipped with 7,000 nuclear warheads. Maybe too amply because there is no ensuing next step upward. If the gaps between the individual rungs of a ladder are too wide, one cannot make the step upward. The detachment of European NATO from the central strategic nuclear arms of the United States would thus have taken place.

The consequence is that the potential adversary could consider this as indicating that the United States secretly deems a limited nuclear war in Europe as possible. The risk would become predictable. It is not decisive how one sees oneself, but how one is seen by the adversary. Deterrence is a matter of perception.

NATO's efforts to close the arms gap in the medium-range field is supposed to be decided on by the Council of Ministers from 11-14 December in Brussels. Politically it is loaded with emotions. The public of Western Europe so far has not been prepared everywhere to see the closing of the arms gap in connection with procurement of new instruments for the fulfillment of the strategy.

The question of exchanging missiles for missiles is being discussed casually, as if it were a matter of offsetting Soviet arms piece by piece. Others want to make sure that the new NATO arms will be in a position to destroy individual Soviet missiles in their positions.

The first argument disregards the devastating effect of a signal given to Moscow suggesting that Washington considers a limited nuclear war in Europe as possible. The second ignores the fact that it is impossible to spot the firing positions of the highly mobile Soviet SS-20 missiles and supply target data to Western counterarms. NATO's medium-range arms can threaten only adequate Soviet military targets effectively as steps of a ladder, not more and not less.

NATO's winter meeting fulfills an alibi function. U.S. nuclear arms are located in European NATO countries on the basis of bilateral cooperation agreements. But it seems important to the European governments to be able to tell their individual publics that NATO decided to close the arms gap.

The Federal Republic could decide for itself on the stationing of new U.S. nuclear arms. The chancellor does not want that. Political considerations

with regard to the East and the West are predominant. A broad majority decision of NATO member states is being sought, even of such states as Norway and Denmark which traditionally do not permit the stationing of nuclear arms on their territories in peacetime. A broad basis will create freedom of action and it will naturally strengthen the arms control offer to be made to Moscow simultaneously with the decision to close the arms gap.

It is the chancellor's will that there be a difference between the stationing of new NATO medium-range arms and the current settlement of the nuclear arms problem: At least the Federal Republic of Germany, and possibly also other NATO countries, will not make available delivery means for the new U.S. nuclear arms. This is to avoid giving the impression--it is not more than giving an impression when authority to handle the nuclear arms is involved--that the Germans have their finger on the trigger. The new arms including the delivery means carrying them to their targets are supposed to be handled and watched only by American personnel.

Nuclear arms with a range up to 1,000 kilometers in most NATO states are being handled and for the most part also guarded by non-American personnel. They are integrated into NATO's armed forces. Only the actual nuclear warhead is kept under sole American two-key control. Two U.S. officers have key authority. Nobody else.

This means in practice that a Starfighter with the emblem of Belgium or the Iron Cross of the German Luftwaffe stands by 24 hours a day with full tanks, warmed-up electronics and the American nuclear bomb under its tail. In the framework of this example a Belgian or a German pilot would stand by not far from the plane with target data in his pocket.

The two keys for the priming of the bomb are kept by two American officers. Only the U.S. President can give the code word for the priming. The new American nuclear bomb B-61 that has replaced for some time older nuclear bombs in Europe, in addition has a number of electronic safeties built in. One could even blow it up with dynamite without anything serious happening.

But a NATO fighter-bomber has never taken off with a nuclear bomb on board. It will never do that in peacetime. Training flights where NATO pilots drop nuclear bombs take place with small smoke bombs whose ballistic characteristics are similar to the real bomb.

Other NATO arms capable of carrying nuclear explosives are the 155 millimeter Howitzer, the 203 millimeter Howitzer, the Lance missile, the Nike Hercules antiaircraft and the Pershing-I missiles. New warheads are being developed presently for the Howitzers and for Lance, warheads that will be capable of containing neutron elements. This would turn normal nuclear warheads into neutron warheads. President Carter reserved for himself the decision to add these elements.

The stationing of American nuclear warheads in European countries and their integration into NATO's combat units has been settled in bilateral treaties that the United States terms POC (Program of Cooperation). Such treaties have been concluded for decades by the FRG, Great Britain (for the Rhine Army and Royal Air Force units stationed in Germany), Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey. Greece presently does not make use of its treaty, Luxembourg does not participate, but it permits the stationing of U.S. nuclear explosives on its state territory. Portugal is out for geographic reasons. Iceland, Norway and Denmark have no treaties.

The stationing of new nuclear arms which for the first time could reach Soviet territory from Western Europe makes it necessary to work out addenda to the old treaties. Detailed problems must be clarified. Security problems that have taken an important position in the existing treaties will be the main topics, problems making it clear that the actual nuclear arms are subjected to sole U.S. control.

So there will be a fundamental breach in the future between arms of a range under 1,000 kilometers and above it. Lacking integration of the latter in the Bundeswehr indicates that the German armed forces do not want to take over responsibility for them, although they may be targets of long-range Soviet nuclear arms such as the SS-20. A part of German rational sovereignty will be abandoned and thus also a piece of German participation in deterrence and the instruments of a common strategy.

CSO: 3103

COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CENTER-RIGHT OF SPD UNEASY WITH PARTY

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Sep 79 p 12

[Article by Helmut Herles: "Feeling Like Motherless Children--Insecurity Within SPD: Between Chancellor's Election Society and Assembly of the Faithful"]

[Text] Not only the center left of the SPD is dissatisfied with its own cause, falling into the abyss between the governing and the programmatic party. While party leftists like the Bremen politician Scherf see the SPD falling into the role of the CDU in the fifties—that of being a chancellor's election society—members of the center right of the SPD, like Bruno Friedrich, are generally dissatisfied with the party leadership. Friedrich, whose name was for a while mentioned among all possible scenarios for the party's leadership succession, for example as a candidate for the office of party chairman of the SPD, has now resigned as deputy leader of the party's Bundestag fraction, to devote himself to his tasks as vice president of the European Parliament. However, he will become not just a nobody in the SPD's internal discussions. He presides—of late not quite uncontested—over the SPD bezirk Franken, and being at the same time "confident and restive"—his image of the Franks—he poses the question of leadership to his party.

Packed into numerous sentences and observations is his doubt about the present leadership structure of the party. He presents his point with a look to history: Disregarding the question of the federal chancellor's specific power or lack thereof, there is the question of the current structure of leadership. That structure developed since the 1958 party congress at Stuttgart that wanted to face the consequences of the defeat to the Union of Adenauer that had just achieved an absolute majority in parliamentary elections. The leadership structure consists of a party presidium usually meeting weekly, and of two deputy chairmen to assist the party chief. Previously such directive tasks had been reserved for a broadened presidium. Under Ollenhauer the party leader concentrated on international policy and the work of the Bundestag fraction, while his deputies Herbert Wehner and Waldemar von Knoeringen busied themselves with development of the party: "Alfred Nau as treasurer and Willi

Eichler, charged with theoretical work, were two other leading Social Democrats in the top leadership who were active for the party in the Parteihaus. The party received new impulses every day. Almost daily the chairmen talked with the in-house staff, that then channeled these impulses to an extremely experienced and homogeneous functional structure in the districts."

Thus writes Friedrich in an essay published in the SPD monthly NEUE GESELLSCHAFT, a journal whose editor-in-chief is Wehner. A note of disappointment can be heard over the fact that the leadership question has been transferred from the party congress, where it was to be discussed, to the journal, out of consideration for the 1980 election year. But the SPD leader of Franken would not describe the former SPD leadership in such glowing terms, if he did not know that the current SPD presidium can hardly be compared to its predecessor, which prepared the Godesberg program and the change of government in Bonn. What deputy chairman of the SPD could work so intensively in his assigned sector as did von Knoeringen? "When the Godesberg developments caused serious conflicts in the universities, Knoeringen visited all the universities in order to converse individually with the Social Democratic academic groups--more than 30--an indication of the intensity of contact with the younger generation." But even then there had been neglect of theoretical work, of scientific contacts, of youth activities, and of political education.

#### A Party in Search of an Issue

For Friedrich the new role of the SPD as the governing party meant a basic change in the leadership structure, just as previously the party membership had changed with the recruitment of new people from academic and employee backgrounds. The responsibilities of governing are said to busy the leading politicians so much that wide circles of the party feel that "the party is an orphan, or at least a locked up child who seldom gets to see his parents, who have to work overtime in order to support the child." Friedrich's image of the SPD as a locked-up child or an orphan due to the governmental responsibilities of its leadership is an indication of the feeling of insecurity that is not merely limited to the left wing. How does today's leadership shape up? Willy Brandt would not like to "be chased by lightweights." He is looking for a bearable middle course between his private life and his public duty. His deputy, Helmut Schmidt, is chancellor not only in name. The other deputy, Hans Koschnick, is retiring to his post as mayor of Bremen. His successor, to be elected at the Berlin party congress in December, the current minister in the chancellor's office, Wischnewski, might probably be the most likely one to carry out party duties in the manner nostalgically remembered by the NEUE GESELLSCHAFT. The leader of the parliamentary fraction, Wehner, considers himself to be old iron, but does not feel rusty. But having the task of "clearing a path" for Schmidt in parliament and outside that body Wehner has not had the time to devote himself to the SPD in the fashion he once did.

These SPD difficulties of a personal nature are also perceived by Friedrich the ideolog and party theoretician. The leadership structure would determine "whether the SPD is a party in search of issues or more than that--the bearer of a political idea!" To reobtain the ideological and political leadership he suggests a strengthening of the commissions charged with long-term tasks, as well as of the party council (the highest organ between party congresses). His reasoning is that the party presidium will have to concern itself increasingly with daily policy. Thus members of the party leadership and the land organizations should participate more in the ideological and organizational leadership of the party. The question of power seems to be more than a sideward look at the normal changes of a democracy for Social Democrats like Friedrich. Does he want to maintain power at any price? He writes that never again should the situation arise in which the SPD becomes an object of development. "It must do everything to take an active part in determining the direction." Should this sentence be taken as serious dogma, then it can cast doubts on the normal replacement of governing parties by the opposition. Friedrich defends his party against Scherf's charge of "chancellor's election society." "For the first time in Germany a beginning of a socially just state with universal prosperity has been shaped." Friedrich of course neglects to mention that the citizens, the voters for all democratic parties and their leaders participated in this development. For him the SPD chancellors Brandt and Schmidt represent the fulfillment of hopes of generations of German Social Democrats. The average citizen is now able to live under a rule that assures "that he is not ruled by the same people in government who already lord over him at his job" (of course the federal governments before Brandt and Schmidt were not the executive arms of the factory owners).

#### Too Little Spirit

But he also finds fault: "The FRG is suffering from a decline of spirit...We have rebuilt our towns, we are a constitutional state, we are respected in the world, we are wealthy, but where is the spirit...where is there a conscious cooperation of the spirit with public responsibility?" It is well known that the spirit moves when it will, and Friedrich does not say who or what the "spirit" is. He remembers Brandt's attempts to win back the SPD's electoral workers of the past, the authors and intellectuals. "The spiritual substance of our nation must have an open path to the SPD. This access must not be closed by governmental controls in the area of deliberating over the future, because the impression of sacrosanct decisions must not arise. The term 'chancellor's election society' would find less resonance if decisions would be discussed more and justified more." What many are said to expect from the Social Democrats is a restoration of an atmosphere of hope. Hope for what--that Friedrich does not say. The SPD has a larger task than the election of a successor to Hans Koschnick.

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**MILITARY MANEUVERS CAUSE GREAT DAMAGE TO TERRAIN**

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 27 Sep 79 p 7

[Article by Horst Heinemann: "Field Exercises at the 'Tolerance Threshold'"]

[Text] The NATO "Autumn Forge" Fall Maneuvers have once again caused death, injury and enormous destruction. Last year Minister Apel already felt that the public's tolerance threshold had been reached. What is being done to avoid exceeding that threshold?

Six Leopard tanks are slowly and menacingly advancing against enemy positions on the hill above the village of Dittershausen. They are guided by three clattering helicopters cruising behind the steel monsters.

A red compact car is parked by a potato field which borders on a field of stubble. Three women and one man are stooping over their work. They do not even cast a glance at the combat exercises going on in the neighboring field.

Schwalm-Eder-Kreis, in the heart of Northern Hessia, was until last week the very center of Exercise "Constant Enforcer 70," a part of "Autumn Forge."

This is a routine event for the rural population of those areas within the FRG which are frequently plagued by military exercises. The reaction of an old lady, sitting in front of her half-timbered house in the village of Hauptschwenda, dressed in the peasant costume of the Schwalm region (long white stockings; several calf-length black petticoats; black jacket and shawl and a tight top-knot), watches a noisy procession of tanks passing by: "We hear shooting all the time." Hauptschwenda lies on the border of the Schwarzenborn troop exercise area.

It is apparently not so much a routine event for drivers using highway B3 near Zwesten. As two fast propeller-driven aircraft simulate attacks upon enemy troops hiding in the wooded mountains, there is a near-collision on the highway: the drivers' attention was diverted upward by the "battle."

This dangerous version of field exercises entails some of the following: military tents at the edge of village streets; armored vehicles at farm gates; columns of military vehicles on public roads; dangerous encounters,

especially at night, with track vehicles changing direction abruptly; vehicles which often unexpectedly come thrashing out of the woods and shrubbery; intersections placed under military control; children climbing over communication vehicles; muddied roadways; signs reading "No entry except with permission of the referee." Is the population bearing up patiently under all this?

There are limits to patience. There is practically no argument about the necessity for major military maneuvers; but there are occasional outbursts of anger nevertheless.

Near Lischeid, a cursing farmer stamps his feet on the torn-up surface of a sunken road which he cannot leave in his tractor in the direction he wishes to go. A huge Leopard with torn tracks blocks his way in front. The man turns red in the face with fury as, on top of all that, three helicopters thunder past at low level and blow his hat off.

Another farmer, in the village of Appenhain, was unhappy too as a result of a torn tank track: an out-of-control tank impaled his wooden hay barn with its cannon. As the cannon was pulled out, the upper story fell off the barn; its front wall collapsed partially, and bundles of hay were all over the yard.

"We want to be less bureaucratic and more citizen-oriented," emphasizes an official of the Office of Defense Compensation in the Maneuver Damage Center, which has been established in the Harthberg barracks in Schwalmstadt-Treysa. There is a new simplified procedure for paying for most of the damages caused by German, American, Canadian and Belgian troops engaged in exercises in the area. Whereas until last year's exercises an "exercise damage officer" was dispatched to investigate every reported case of damage, all "minor damages" are now compensated with a lump sum. No upper limit for this type of damage has been officially given.

Forestry superintendents' offices and highway maintenance officials complain about torn-up forest paths and broken trees, dented guard rails and pavement edges which have been ground into the gully. In cases of crop damage, the farmer concerned takes his complaint to his local authorities. The locally appointed damage assessor evaluates the damage and judges its severity. The state, being responsible for conducting the maneuver, accepts these estimates, except for "problem cases." Compensation payments, financed like all other defense costs by the tax payer, are generous indeed. The local damage assessors are usually members of the local farming community and are anxious to remain in good standing with their fellow farmers.

In the Damage Center, an American officer shows us a chart on which daily entries are made describing damage to forests, crops, highways, buildings and bodies of water, as well as oil pollution. Alongside these entries are the monetary damage estimates. For the entire FRG, it is estimated that damages caused by the fall maneuvers will exceed DM 20 million, as they did last year (for all of 1978, they amounted to about DM 100 million). This includes only damage to property and does not account for dead or injured soldiers and civilians.

Bundeswehr General Franz-Joseph Schulze, commander-in-chief of Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) "realizes fully what a burden these exercises constitute for the FRG." But like U.S. General Frederick J. Kroesen, commander of the NATO Central Army Group (CENTAG), he can visualize no possibility of dispensing with this test for joint action by units of various national armies.

The commanders emphasize that every possible precaution is taken, e.g., harvest and vacation times are being taken into consideration. Tank commanders are given a 30-page brochure which states that it is better to tear up a field of stubble than to ruin a tractor path. Any damages caused through gross negligence are to be paid for from personal funds of the person responsible for it. Clean-up squads are constantly working; autobahn travel is avoided as much as possible.

But even property damage cannot always be simply taken care of by monetary compensation. Crop field damage, especially in wet soil, can be so extensive that planting soil can become useless for long periods of time.

The FRG Ministry of Defense maintains its own environmental protection office. It analyzes "conflicts of purpose" and develops "remedial actions." One remedial action consists of indoctrination programs for officers and soldiers. A report from the Hardthoehe after the conclusion of the first such program states that "...this has resulted not only in reducing the number of inevitable cases of environmental damage. In addition, considerable savings were made in funds to compensate for damages caused by exercises."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

LAMBSDORFF, OTHERS COMMENT ON MARK REVALUATION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Sep 79 pp 1, 2

[Article by Kg./Ho.: "Lambsdorff: Revaluation of German Mark Was Urgently Needed"]

[Text] Bonn, 24 September--In the opinion of the FRG Minister of Finance Mattheofer, the European currency system has stood its first test. Exchange rates have been adjusted "quietly and effectively." The system turned out to be more flexible than many people had expected, Mattheofer said on Tuesday in Bonn. Count Lambsdorff, FRG minister of economics, indicated that the decision to revalue the German mark had been urgently needed. Otherwise the next few weeks would have brought an uncontrolled expansion of the money supply and new inflation.

During the night from Sunday to Monday, especially at the behest of the Bundesbank and the FRG government, the ministers and the governors of the issuing banks of the European currency system decided to establish new official rates. Accordingly, in the European currency system the German mark will be revalued by approximately 2 percent. At the same time the Danish krone will be devalued by approximately 3 percent.

Nevertheless, the Brussels resolutions did not, as was partially expected, lead to a stabilization of the dollar. The exchange rate of the dollar continued its decline on Monday. Uncertainty continued to affect foreign-exchange markets (see economics). Mattheofer commented on the fact that the FRG government had an interest in the stabilization of the dollar. "I am careful, however, about making any prediction about the exchange rate of the dollar," the minister said. When considering purchase power, the German mark is valued too highly. In Brussels all member nations of the Currency League had tried "earnestly and constructively" to find a solution. The result presents a compromise which was not easy for anybody. Even he himself "could have imagined better" results. But Mattheofer did not say what this remark was referring to.

Matthofer called attention to the fact that in recent times there had been tensions on foreign-currency markets. In part this was due to third-nation currencies which had been brought into the system. The adjustment, ranging up to 2.25 percent, had "relieved the tension." At the same time, attempts had been made to take precautions for future developments. The impact of the oil price increases was still having an effect. The impact of the revaluation of the German mark would limit the burden for the German export trade.

The average revaluation rate, reflecting the proportion of foreign trade with various countries, is 2.15 percent. According to the newly established exchange rates, in the future one European currency unit (Ecu) will correspond to DM 2.48557 (to date it was DM 2,51064). Compared to the Ecu, the value of which was calculated from a currency basket containing all currencies of the European currency system, including Great Britain's, the FRG is experiencing a revaluation of 1.01 percent, Denmark a devaluation of 3.8 percent, the remaining member nations a devaluation of 0.97 percent. In essence this means that the change in the official rate of the German mark, compared to the Ecu, is 1 percent. This change in the official rate of the German mark, when compared to the Ecu, was still low enough that an additional adjustment for agricultural trade across the borders of the European Community is out of the question.

The Brussels currency resolutions were applauded almost unanimously on Monday by politicians and economic organizations. Still, many commentaries contain statements asking the FRG government to act more quickly in the future, discussing with partner nations adjustments in official exchange rates. FRG Minister of Economics Lambsdorff states that the Brussels resolutions were "urgently needed." Recent accumulations of foreign currency holdings, amounting to approximately DM 20 billion net, could be compensated only on a short-term basis; for the FRG the danger had become too great of an uncontrolled expansion of the money supply, which over the long run would be almost impossible to manage. Of equal importance, however, was the direct import of inflation as a result of the real devaluation of the German mark which had occurred in recent months. Lambsdorff estimated the real devaluation effect of the German mark toward the most important trade partners to be at least 2 percent. Because of the adjustment which had just been decided, the Bundesbank would be able again to engage in a monetary policy which, on one hand, was fighting the impending dangers to stability and, on the other hand, would leave sufficient latitude for growth.

In the opinion of the FRG League of German Banks, the exchange rate adjustment was unavoidable. The most recent tensions had clearly demonstrated this, Bank President Kuehnen stated. The fact that the ministers of finance and issuing bank presidents had acted quickly was an indication of the flexibility of the system. Last but not least, the point in time for the correction seemed favorable with a view toward the approaching Belgrade Conference of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

The German League of Savings Banks and Credit Associations also stated that the revaluation of the German mark was a measure which had been overdue. As a consequence the chances had risen for the stabilization of the FRG money market. The Savings Banks Association is advising the FRG government that in the future necessary adjustments within the currency system be made more quickly in order to avoid massive interventions by the Bundesbank, something that had become necessary in recent weeks. The Association for the Protection of Savings criticized the fact that in their opinion the correction came too late.

The commentary of the Federation of German Industry--as was expected--points to the fact that the revaluation is accompanied by higher prices for exports. Altogether, however, industry feels that safeguarding a stable currency has a higher priority. Nevertheless, better relations in exchange rates can only be established when the United States fulfills its key role in the world currency system by establishing a consistent policy. Moreover, member nations within the European currency system must attune their economic policies among themselves more than has been the case to date.

The speaker for the opposition on financial policies, CDU delegate Haefeke, doubted the fact that the FRG government had acted timely and adequately in order to limit the expansion of the money supply and to meet inflationary dangers. The European Currency League must not become an "inflation association." It is therefore imperative that exchange-rate adjustments be made as soon as necessary.

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CSO: 3103

**MAJOR PARTIES BEGIN BUILDING PLATFORMS FOR 1981 ELECTIONS****Programs Fill Political Void**

Paris LE FIGARO in French 11 Sep 79 p 4

[Text] The political class is strangely absent from the essential debates. The fact of its being out of touch with the realities became apparent in a blinding flash on the occasion of the elections to the European Assembly. Since then, the political class has been experiencing the feeling of its emptiness. The government ignores it, and public opinion considers it with distrust. However, this affirmation will not make it forget the 1981 presidential election.

In this perspective, programs are springing up with an intent to fill the political void.

Let us consider the socialists' program first. They are attempting to bring a little order to the cacaphony of the factions confronting one another within their party. Today, Francois Mitterrand will arbitrate their differences.

The majority is not resting. Last week, in Vitel, Lionel Stoleru surprised his Giscardian friends by inviting them to adopt a doctrinal program. Doubtless he was not aware that during an interview with PARIS MATCH Valery Giscard d'Estaing was filling this void.

Jean Meo's thoughts on behalf of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] appear to be more concrete and less concerned with the 1981 date. The report to which he is putting the final touches will define the outline of an economic and social policy capable, according to the RPR, of providing a solution to the crisis which is sweeping the country.

Mitterrand, et al., Socialist Party

Paris LE FIGARO in French 11 Sep 79 p 4

[Article by Jacques Fleury]

[Text] This day will be very important for the Socialist Party [PS]. The entire future of the country will depend upon the position which Francois Mitterrand will take before the commission charged with preparation of the social program which the socialists wish to implement if they come to power. A meeting which in mathematical terms is translated into an equation with two unknowns: Mitterrand plus Rocard, plus Mauroy plus Chevenement equals a PS united around the same philosophy and unanimous in proposing a solution for the crisis or perhaps Mitterrand plus Chevenement equal Mauroy plus Rocard, equals two or three different social programs which would for a long time put an end to socialist ambitions of being "the first part of France" and of offering an alternative to the present government and the Communist Party.

The first secretary's statements, therefore, will be analyzed with care by the various factions of the PS which will take time to think it over before supporting them or to definitely disassociate themselves from the deputy from Nievre. If such a scenario were to take place--in spite of everything it is quite unlikely--the procedure for the designation of the candidate for the presidential elections within the PS would become a veritable confrontation. The Epinay party would experience the same convulsions as the defunct SFIO [French Section of the Workers International] in its last stage.

At the last congress in Metz, the officials of the new PS majority were cynical about the chances of Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard for long remaining unified and autonomous within the party. According to them, the followers of the mayor of Lille and those of the deputy from Yvelines were going to melt away like snow in the sun: their friends were going to abandon them very quickly to rally to the banner of Francois Mitterrand. The doctrine at that time was: "It is better to have a socialist party which is perhaps weaker but coherent in its doctrine rather than a large PSU [Unified Socialist Party]." To put it plainly this was translated by the will of the new leaders to allow those who rejected the approved line, even slightly, in the congress to depart, rather than compromise and seek the "synthesis" demanded by the minorities.

Those "in the majority" are forced to reopen the debate today. Their analysis of "the natural impoverishment" of the Mauroy and Rocard factions ended suddenly. Instead of taking to their heels, the minorities strengthened themselves. The status of forces present within the PS has quite appreciably changed to the point that no one can really say that "the majority is always the majority."

It is in this context that the Socialist Party has taken up the preparation of its social program. An ambitious project since the text will serve as the program of the candidate for the Elysee but will also justify the actions of the socialists for the next decade.

Jean-Pierre Chevenement, national secretary, was charged with drawing up the guidelines of the program to orient the debate. The leader of the CERES [Center for Studies, Research and Education] (the party's left wing), even though he lined up with Francois Mitterrand to constitute the new majority with him, was unable to repudiate his origins: he gave his text a Marxist coloration which some even consider sympathetic to the communists. Very severe criticisms, therefore, are being formulated on all sides against this draft-program.

Although the friends of Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard have agreed to have this "rehash" taken into consideration as the basis of discussion, it was for the purpose of allowing them to amend it. Could they have done otherwise without risking excommunication? Having shown their good will "in the interest of the party" by not breaking the unity at the outset, they have every intention of modifying the wording and the philosophy of the draft-program which they judge to be excessive. Even if they have to provoke a "clash" [word in English] and call upon every activist.

Francois Mitterrand, who up to now has remained prudently reserved, will have to arbitrate. His margin for maneuvering is narrow. A future candidate for the presidential election--everything points to his presenting himself as a candidate once again--he must take into account both the efforts of the PC [Communist Party] which likens him to a representative of "the bourgeoisie" and the need for bringing about the unification of the party to have the best chances in 1981. He can neither condemn nor approve.

Therefore, everything leads one to think that the socialist leader will confine himself to a philosophical statement pleasing to every faction, as regards the program or plans. He knows only too well that detailed programs are traps: he is the first to take up the case against the government by comparing the programs and the administration's management.

Lionel Stoleru, Giscardian Party

Paris LE FIGARO in French 11 Sep 79 p 4

[Interview with Lionel Stoleru, secretary of state in charge of manual laborers and immigrants, date not given]

[Text] In an interview, Lionel Stoleru explains his draft ideological platform which is intended to provide Giscardians with matters for thought concerning the 1981 presidential election.

[Question] Lionel Stoleru, in Vitel you proposed to the Giscardian movement that it engage in a vast indoctrination effort by drawing up an ideological

platform. Do you feel that in these gloomy times the French have more concrete concerns?

[Answer] Marxism is dead, and in the vacuum it left there is a rush of ideas that it is important to sort out. There are positive things to be drawn from these new currents; however, while we are engaged in such reflection we must not allow certain serpents to slip in which demonstrated their venom some 10 years ago. That is one of the reasons why I am getting ready to establish a dialog with representatives of the Club de l'Horloge, for example.

Getting back to your question, the preparation of an ideological platform for 1981 seems necessary to me. It was already difficult to obtain political adherence at a strong rate of growth; therefore, the present rate of 2 to 3 percent induces us to leave the economic and social sectors to enlarge the debate by moving from the society of consumption to the society of satisfaction.

[Question] Is it not a gimmick to distract the attention of the French?

[Answer] No, it is not an alibi. Young people are seeking happiness which is not a matter of maximum purchasing power. Happiness will come from something else, and our ambition is to clarify a happier society around a less brilliant society in the economic sector. Satisfaction is not measured by consumption. Above and beyond the guarantee of base purchasing power, happiness is not proportional to wealth. Therefore, it is up to us to discover the lifestyle around that which Valery Giscard d'Estaing recently called temperate growth.

[Question] Is this not an intellectual approach which runs the risk of disconcerting the French?

[Answer] This is not an initiative by intellectuals; it is a political action initiative which must rest upon a political apparatus--the UDF [French Democratic Union]--and upon elected officials in a position to sense the currents which are the carriers of public opinion. The proof of this is that Jacques Blanc intends to take an initial step in this direction at the next PR [expansion unknown] congress. Above all there must not be a break between the parliamentary group and the group of intellectuals which could constitute the working team, otherwise the initiative would be disembodied. What is needed is a program submitted for discussion. This program could not be that of the hive or of the horde but a humanist plan, worthy of Western culture, based on the essential values of peace, progress and justice. This program cannot remain eternally in suspense [en pointille]. Then new possibilities will open up for the majority: rebuild with all, with certain political forces of the left perhaps, and in any event with a party of its electorate, notably socialist, a broader national entente.

Jean Meo, Gaullist Party

Paris LE FIGARO in French 11 Sep 79 p 4

[Article by Patrice H. Desaubliaux]

[Text] "Our disagreement with certain of the orientations of the policy followed by the government does not mean that we have changed sides or ideals," Jacques Chirac told the Rally [Reunion] recently. These comments are certainly important to an appreciation of the RPR's attitude in the face of political and also economic and social problems. The former prime minister has already had the opportunity of telling those who very regularly charge him with wishing to rejoin the opposition: "We will never engage in the policy of creating crisis to benefit therefrom [La politique du pire], as this would be the worst of policies."

In the economic sector that means the RPR is and will continue to be attached to the society of freedom, responsibility and participation advocated by the Gaullists since the beginning of the Fifth Republic which, at least in its broad outlines, is that defended by his partners of the majority. More precisely, the RPR's objective, like that of the government, is the recovery of the economy so that it will be in a position "to face up to the situation." Where the differences with the government begin to appear is with respect to priorities and the way to go about attaining the objective. In other words, properly speaking, it is not an "alternative policy" that the RPR intends to propose, as this alternative policy could only come from factions not belonging to the majority.

#### Practitioner of Economic

"Certain Gaullists say that our situation is comparable to that of navigators following a transatlantic course: the ships and conditions of navigation are the same for all contestants. The navigator who follows the best route wins. And we think that Raymond Barre is not having the good ship France follow the best route."

According to the RPR, what is the best route? For several weeks with remarkable discretion one man has been making an effort to determine that route: Jean Meo, who was appointed Jacques Chirac's economic counselor last April.

A graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique, former technical counselor of General de Gaulle, from 1958 to 1960, Jean Meo worked for a long time in the group of the General Oil Union which later became Elf-ERAP [expansion unknown]. From 1972 to 1974 in the Hachette group director general delegate of the FEP [expansion unknown] which notably published FRANCE-SOIR. Finally, from 1974 to 1978 he was the president of Havas. Therefore, he is less a theoretician than a practitioner of economics.

The proposals which he will submit to the central committee of the movement on 23 September will be within the framework of the broad outlines developed

by Jacques Chirac for over 2 years. Before the legislative elections, the former prime minister had toured France emphasizing at every stop that it was proper to give priority to employment and impetus to productive investments. Meo's report will take this base as its point of departure.

Reportedly he will particularly study how the revival of productive investment can be brought about, with account taken of the present and predictable evolution of the general economic situation and taking into consideration the problem of maintenance of the great equilibriums, even though the latter no longer have priority.

An important part of Meo's report is said to deal with what is customarily called industrial redeployment; i.e., placing stress on investments in advanced technology and high competitiveness. There, too, it will be a matter of quickly formulating realistic and attainable objectives.

Finally, one section of this report ostensibly will be devoted to participation, a subject dear to the Gaullists who are convinced that this should be a counterpart of efforts and restraints. For the RPR, in fact, the conduct of the economy can only be based on the efforts and solidarity of the French and on the rigor and political will of their leaders.

In this one finds once again the concerns which have for a long time been those of Michel Debre, even if the actions taken are somewhat different. It was as an individual that the former prime minister set forth his proposals at the end of the month of August, while the present mission of Jean Meo consists in preparing a report on which the parliamentarians and cadres of the RPR, members of the central committee, are to comment, after possible amendments.

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## NEW DIRECTIONS, TENDENCIES ON POLITICAL LEFT

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Sep 79 p 11

[Article by Roger-Gerard Schwartzenberg, European Parliament Deputy and Vice President of the Left Radical Movement (MRG)]

[Text] Never has failure been so obvious. Never has the government been so unpopular. Never has the expectation of change been so profound. But never has change seemed so far away. And never has the left been so disappointed. The result of its management of the 1978 defeat. The result of its continually trotting out its grievances. The result of flaunting the quarrels of its cliques and staffs.

The present bilateral meetings, therefore, are an important event in themselves. Even though everyone is assessing their limitations. But what really counts is the programmatic thinking going on in each party. So necessary is it to sketch the face of another left. More diverse. More concrete. Newer.

#### A Diverse Left

First, a diverse left. Accepting its pluralism. Accepting the diversity of its components. Accepting the fact that it must enrich itself and convince the greatest number of the voters that it should be recognized for itself. For the union of the left is not undergoing uniformization. By the banalization of its various parties. Quite the contrary.

The PCF defends its own doctrine and theses. With its last energy. That is its right. And even its merit. But it is up to the rest of the left to do likewise. It is its task to affirm its own culture just as clearly. Its own "pattern."

In truth, there have always been two great "patterns" within the left. One of the state control and centralizing type. The other based on decentralization and redistribution of power downward. To the groups and associations.

It is up to the noncommunist left to defend and deepen its own conception. Without giving in to conformism or complacency. Without converging excessively with the dogmas and standards of others.

That would be the case if by chance its new plan finally carried with it more centralism than decentralization. More state control than self-management. More expansion of nationalizations than influence on the economy.

#### A Concrete Left

That would be the case if it preferred the reconquest of the domestic market to the point where it turned into protectionism. If not into autarchy.

That would be the case if it were more concerned with national independence than with internationalism. Or if it favored "detente" in Europe over European building.

That would be the case, finally, if it referred more to traditional values than to the new freedoms, the demand for which is conveyed by the legitimate protesting of the "fringe."

Moreover, faced with the economic crisis and the government's failures, the French expect from the left something other than a scholastic debate on the hundred-year-old dogmas of elementary Marxism. They undoubtedly expect a less brilliantly theoretical left. More practical. And more operational.

A left with its feet on the ground and its head on its shoulders. In short, a "government left" of the Mendesist type, ready to take over command of the state tomorrow. In direct touch with the great problems of the time, which the government treats with such lack of success or such incompetence.

Like the energy crisis. With its perils for the balance of trade, economic activity and employment. Like the industrial policy. With the necessary effort toward high-technology production, the creator of jobs, which represents the industrial adventure of the 21st century: data processing, micro-electronics, aeronautics, exploitation of the oceans, bio-industry, new forms of energy.

Of course this industrial policy is to be defined within the framework of democratic planning. In order to bring out a rationality and collective will. In order to prevent the visual flying that hands over the conduct of the national economy to arbitration by large private groups.

That the majority is uninterested in the Plan is in the order of things and conforms to "liberal" logic. But the left and its elected representatives could have shown themselves to be more inventive and more on the offensive in the parliamentary debate on the broad options of the Eighth Plan--that sceptical and indecisive document that gives our collective destiny a flabby appearance.

#### A New Left

From now on, moreover, the left should propose that this Economic Plan be coupled with a "Social Plan." In order to program precisely the reduction of inequities. In order to organize, with force, national solidarity in favor of the unemployed, the aged, the handicapped.

But the left not only has to contribute concrete responses to the economic crisis. It must also respond to the "cultural" crisis. To that "malaise of civilization" that is gradually developing.

It is true: an entire electorate, often young and attentive to the new struggles, does not feel that it fits into the traditional left. For the latter seems to them to accept the society of malaise. Not to say the "repressive" society, in its psychoanalytic meaning. The society that sacrifices the natural tendencies and true needs. The society that spreads tension, alienation and constraint.

This critical electorate awaits an innovative and nonconformist left that draws up the plan of a different society in which life is otherwise. A new left, a place to express new sensibilities. The society of the young, the ecologists, the regionalists.

A left that is familiar with Marx and Engels, but is not unaware of Reich and Goodman, Roszak and Mumford. In short, a left in motion, developing a "strategy of rupture" with the repressive society.

### Six Struggles

This new left would fight to break the politicking system. To see to it that public life ceases to be a profession, a spectacle and the territory of the money king. It would propose to develop, on the local and national level, opportunities for popular initiative and referendum. It would demand that a strict ceiling be placed on electoral expenses, and that financing for elections be provided by the state. It would fight for the right of expression for small organizations and minority groups.

This new left would make it a point to limit the state. To put the state in its place. To give life to the "civilian society" that has been anesthetized and crushed by the big central apparatus. The objective would be to redistribute power to the rank and file. Not to replace a rightist technocracy with a leftist technocracy.

It would seek to slow down the society of moderation. The "great anonymous society" of the megalopolises and multinationals, which crushes the individual. It would take up the slogan "Small is beautiful". In order to design an economy at man's level, which would favor industrial implantations of small or medium size, putting to work technologies that would be soft and more energy-economical.

This new left would occupy itself with reversing society's uniformity, which makes everyone equal to everyone else. Normalized. Standardized. It would encourage the opening up of differences. A variety of lifestyles and cultures. It would recognize the right of each region to its own personality. In order to revive a France with savor and color. A France of diversity. From Brittany to Corsica. From Alsace to Languedoc.

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\*Ernest Schumacher, "Small is Beautiful," Seuil, 1978.

This lively left would devote itself to preventing the society of pollution and all-nuclear power. The society of the "Amoco-Cadiz" and the "Super-Phoenix." It would mobilize to preserve nature and the great biologic equilibriums of the ecosystem.

Finally, the new left would act intransigently to defend human rights. It would refuse to keep quiet or merely mumble timid reproaches in the face of Argentinian torture chambers and Gulag camps. It would refuse to keep silent in the face of the extermination by hunger that is striking down millions of human beings in the world.

#### A Radical Change

It would be useless to claim that these new aspirations are the monopoly of one organization or another. For they are widely shared by several leftist forces--political, labor union, or cultural--which are already at work.

For its part, and in its place, the MRG intends to contribute to the renewal of the left. As it has already begun to do. Has been doing for months. And sometimes for years. By practising ecology in the field, as in La Rochelle. By proposing--the first on the left to do so--a nuclear power referendum. By demonstrating at Creys-Malville. By filing a bill to prevent money from ruling over policy. By launching campaigns for the "new freedoms" or the "four D's:" human dimension, diversity, decentralization, human rights\*.

Today, as yesterday, the MRG is hoping a concrete left will assert itself more, contributing precise answers to the big problems of the present, as a left of new sensibilities, designing a different society in which life will be different.

Change tomorrow depends on an attractive alternative. And that alternative is undoubtedly coming to pass. Through development, with the opposition, within the new left. This greener, more alive left. Tuned in to the times and the movement of life.

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\*See R.-G. Schwartzberg, "Radicals," LE MONDE, 9 July 1976; "New Freedoms," LE MONDE, 12-13 February and 14 February 1978; "Innovation and Credibility," LE MONDE, 30 March 1978; "The Four D's," LE MONDE, 27 September 1978.

**MARCHAIS ASSESSES ALGERIA VISIT: FLN, POLISARIO RELATIONS**

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 4 Sep 79 p 8

[Text] The press conference held yesterday afternoon at the headquarters of the PCF Central Committee [CC] included Georges Marchais, surrounded by Maxime Gremetz, Political Bureau member and CC secretary, Pierre Juquin, Political Bureau member, Jacques Denis, CC member and assistant chief of the foreign policy division, and Alain Gresh, a member of the foreign policy division.

As you know, I have just made a 4-day visit to Algeria at President Chadli's invitation.

This visit, which is part of a now well-established tradition of relations between the French Communist Party and the FLN [National Liberation Front] Party, in our opinion has assumed an importance which I will not hesitate to describe as exceptional.

Following the loss of my friend Houari Boumediene, in particular it has enabled me to meet the new general secretary of the FLN, President Chadli. During the warm reception which he accorded me, I must say that I discovered a competent, candid and responsible statesman.

My visit was also marked by many political talks with other Algerian leaders --in particular Mohamed Yahiaoui, party coordinator. The valuable results of these talks are reflected in the joint communique made public yesterday and which you have no doubt noted. However, allow me to review two aspects of these results, which deserve our special attention since they concern our country directly. I want to talk about the matter of French-Algerian relations and the situation in Western Sahara.

**Relations between France and Algeria**

Our party attaches great importance to relations between France and Algeria, to the productive relations which the two countries could and should maintain in all areas.

I was therefore particularly happy to hear those with whom I spoke formally reaffirm Algeria's willingness to develop political, economic, scientific and cultural cooperation with France. Thus President Chadli made a point of telling me: "We want to start a new chapter in relations between our two countries, in the interest of our two peoples and future generations." Thus he extended the message which President Boumediene had directed me to convey to our people 5 years ago.

I must say that when the Algerian Government's policy is not examined *a priori*, it is actually impossible to fail to note that nothing--absolutely nothing--characterizing it contradicts the interests of our country and the aspirations of our people. On the contrary, I was able to confirm the unquestionable willingness of Algerian leaders to do their best to remove the remaining obstacles to the development of harmonious, balanced and mutually productive relations between our two countries.

We French communists are convinced that it is definitely in the interest of France to take seriously the fervent and obviously sincere desire of Algerian leaders to turn the page of the past. This Algerian political good will must now be met with the same willingness on the part of the French Government. France must today begin privileged relations with the countries and peoples formerly subject to its colonialism. This is particularly true of Algeria. A few weeks away from the 25th anniversary on 1 November 1954--which marks the beginning of the Algerian Revolution--it is time, it is high time to clearly start a new stage in our relations.

#### A People Whose Painful History Has Made Us Near and Dear

I said that this was the desire of Algeria and the wish of the French Communist Party. I am sure that this prospect would also be in keeping with the wishes of most of our fellow countrymen. Some of them have opposed colonialism, sometimes even running the risk of sacrificing their freedom and agreeing to put their very lives in danger. They are the first to wish that France will finally treat the Algerian people officially as a people whose painful history has made us near and dear. But they are not the only ones to think this.

In fact, other Frenchmen--and they are many--were sent by the governments of the time into an unjust war which they did not want and whose real meaning was also concealed from them. How many of them paid dearly--sometimes with their lives--for having been dragged--against their interests and aspirations--by the government at that time into its mad adventure! I am convinced that all these generations, their families and friends, have only one desire: that the period of confrontations, enmity and distrust, benefiting neither the French nor the Algerian people, will finally be over. They also hope that a period of friendly cooperation between our two countries will begin.

Still others, victims particularly of the intolerable behavior of a minority of rich colonialists, have been driven to leave Algeria to settle in France.

Among them--many witnesses have confirmed this to me--there are many who have also continued to keep a place in their hearts for Algeria.

#### Too Many Opportunities Missed

I therefore believe that I express a general feeling of the French in saying to the government: we must not wait any longer to establish cooperative ties of a new nature with Algeria. Too much time has already been wasted, too many opportunities have been missed in this area, simply because we were not willing to recognize the realities of today and to really rely on the considerable potential which they hold for our two countries.

I have already had the opportunity to point out in this respect that good words are not enough unless they are followed by actions. It is impossible not to note that the visit which the president of the republic made to Algeria in 1975 did not produce the results which could have been expected, causing deep disappointment among our partners.

#### Many Varied Possibilities

Even recently, Mr Jean Francois-Poncet noted good intentions during his visit to Algiers. The Algerian minister of foreign affairs, Mr Ben Yahia, will soon visit France in turn.

Thus a new opportunity is being offered. I am anxious to point out how much it matters, in our opinion, not to let it pass this time.

Possibilities of cooperation between our two countries are actually numerous and diverse. I would like to illustrate their range with a few examples.

First, from a political standpoint, where the interests of France and Algeria are far from being contradictory. These two countries on the Mediterranean actually have a common interest in developing friendly relations, in fostering together a solution to conflicts--those in the northwest of Africa as well as in the Near East--in helping to make that part of the world an area of peace and cooperation.

This particularly calls for a French-Algerian dialog in view of the conference of governments to be held in Madrid in 1980.

Economic cooperation as well--with the understanding that these relations must be established on the basis of both countries' mutual interest.

Thus at a time when France is experiencing a serious economic crisis, when we are witnessing the closing of industrial plants, of entire sectors of the economy, an increase in unemployment, the development of economic cooperation with a country like Algeria is an important asset to our country. At the same time it is needed by Algeria, which has to deal with the consequences of colonization and underdevelopment.

Based on a dual established fact, it is possible to judge the lack of positive results to be gained for France from the current status of our trade with Algeria. On one hand, whereas France supplied Algeria with 42 percent of its imports in 1970, it does not supply it with more than 20 percent today. On the other, contracts signed by French companies with Algeria have dropped from F 4.4 billion in 1974 to F 2.5 billion in 1978. However, Algeria's needs are considerable.

This situation is even more regrettable since Algeria is making significant efforts to develop the country particularly in terms of industry.

I will take only one example, that of housing. The Algerian Government's goal is to build 100,000 dwellings annually. That is an ambitious program which offers extremely attractive prospects for French businesses.

At the same time, it is obviously necessary to restore an upward balance in trade--whose deficit was F 3.700 billion in 1978 to Algeria's detriment. A priority effort must be made in the area of energy. New contracts for the supply of gas must be negotiated and cooperation in the area of oil must be revived.

#### Problem of Immigrant Workers

Finally, a problem at the core of French-Algerian relations is that of immigrant workers in France. On this issue, our party has taken a clear and responsible position.

First of all, we consider that foreign workers currently living in France--whether they are Algerian, Moroccan, Portuguese, Italian or others--have substantially contributed, and often under difficult and sometimes even humiliating conditions, to the expansion of our national economy. That is not only an economic reality, but a human reality, which must be remembered today. It is also necessary to recall that Algerian immigration was not the result of the Algerian Government's intention, but of colonialism practiced in Algeria by French governments.

For all these reasons, we firmly reject the racist and demagogic bill by which Mr Giscard d'Estaing's government is trying--with difficulty--to legalize the expulsion of immigrant workers. We are and will be unyielding in our fight to protect the rights of Algerian workers currently living in France, as well as their security and dignity. In general, I wish to add that in our opinion a more balanced distribution of immigrant workers among our country's cities is necessary, in the interest of both these workers and the French people.

Secondly, in view of the extent of unemployment in France, we stated long ago that we were in favor of stopping immigration. This position coincides with the responsible policy of the Algerian Government which--this is very often overlooked--has itself decided since 1973 to stop any new departure of Algerian workers to countries such as ours.

By way of these few examples, everyone can note: it is possible and desirable to move forward quickly toward broad and diverse cooperation between our two countries.

We communists will in turn campaign actively in favor of such a policy, which is in keeping with the interests of France and Algeria, the French and Algerian peoples and all peoples of the Mediterranean and the international community. In accordance with the aims of our 23rd Congress, we will support every step forward in this direction, since this is the path of wisdom.

#### Situation in Western Sahara

The second matter which I am anxious to bring to your attention is the situation in Western Sahara. This problem was actually a major consideration in my trip, especially since during my visit I met--as you know--the general secretary of the POLISARIO Front: Mohamed Abdelaziz. The talk which we had also revealed totally identical views concerning the particulars of the situation in that part of Africa.

Thus the very positive events which comprised the OAU summit in Monrovia and then the signing of the Algiers agreements between Mauritania and the POLISARIO Front, following the military and diplomatic successes by the same Front, have resulted in a new situation. The Madrid agreement is now null and void. The conflict now exclusively involves the POLISARIO Front on one hand and the Moroccan Government on the other.

In this regard I want to emphasize that insofar as they are concerned, Algerian leaders have strongly demonstrated their support of the OAU principle which requires that the inherited borders of colonization be respected. The condition necessary for the restoration of peace in that area is therefore clear: Morocco must immediately abandon its expansionist policy and withdraw from all territory of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, i.e., the entire Western Sahara, and recognize the Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence.

In view of this situation, all countries--particularly our own--are morally obliged to defend this OAU principle which is today being challenged by Hassan II.

#### Demands to President of the Republic

Now it must definitely be admitted that the French Government has a heavy responsibility in this affair. It has supported the policy of Morocco and has provided it with arms. It has intervened militarily against the POLISARIO Front. That is an intolerable position, which sets our country totally against the aspirations of peoples and the development of events in that part of the world.

I also note that the French Government has just come out in favor of respecting Mauritania's borders. I therefore ask: why then does it not embrace this same principle--of universal value--with regard to the Saharan people?

Under these circumstances and in the name of the French Communist Party, I formally demand that the president of the republic: first, issue a statement in favor of respecting all borders inherited from colonization in that part of Africa; second, allow France to continue to effectively guarantee respect for Mauritania's borders. We know that the only two countries threatening that nation are Hassan II's Morocco and Senghor's Senegal. Mr Giscard d'Estaing must therefore require his ally Hassan II to abandon his support of the so-called "free Mauritanian officers"; he must stop supplying arms to a government which does not conceal its expansionist aims; third, I demand that France take real steps in proportion to the role which it can play in helping to restore peace in that area of the world. In particular, the French Government must ultimately recognize the POLISARIO Front, whose fight for an entire people has established its indisputable representativeness.

Such are the reasonable and constructive proposals, ladies and gentlemen, submitted by the French Communist Party following this important visit.

If our party has decided to refer this group of problems to public opinion starting today, it is because we want, at all costs, to keep France from once again being the last country to recognize the realities of our time.

Whether the issues are national or international, our position is always the same: we do not intend to postpone solving urgent problems until some other time. We will therefore act without waiting, in this regard as well, to promote any progress and any step forward.

This is in keeping with the aspirations of our people and the interests of France, and I will add: with the mission of our party.

This is what I wanted to say to you before we open, if you wish, the discussion. In the context of this introduction, I wanted to limit myself to discussing relations between Algeria and France and the situation in Western Sahara. I now wish to state that the French Communist Party and the FLN have decided to develop their cooperation in all areas. Politically, on one hand this specifically concerns support for the cause of the Palestinian people, whose legitimate representative is the PLO, and on the other the action to be taken in favor of a new economic and political world order.

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CSO: 3100

## MARCHAIS OUTLINES PRINCIPLES OF PCF EUROPEAN POLICY

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 27 Sep 79 p 11

[Report on Georges Marchais press conference in Strasbourg on 26 Sep 79, by Laurent Sauerwein]

[Text] Strasbourg, 26 September--Yesterday Georges Marchais, PCF general secretary and European Assembly deputy, held a press conference for some 150 journalists in the Palace of Europe. Many questions were asked during the conference. Georges Marchais' introductory statement appears below.

"Allow me first of all to express my joy at being in Strasbourg today. This beautiful city, charged with history, is headquarters for the European Assembly sessions, and must continue to be.

"Despite the commitments made along that line before the elections, voices are being raised today on the right and on the left, asking that this choice be questioned again. Madame Veil herself just made a speech indicating that the government is ready to sacrifice Strasbourg as Assembly headquarters. This would be a further renouncement on the part of Mr Giscard d'Estaing--following the lamentable Agriculture Commission affair.

"For its part, the position of the PCF on this subject is clear. It has not varied and will not vary: the European Assembly must continue to hold its sessions in Strasbourg.

"Having made that point, before answering your questions I should like to mention briefly the place we occupy and the objectives we have in the Assembly.

"As you no doubt know, our Party has been represented at Strasbourg since 1973. We went from three members of Parliament to five, then--last 10 June--to 19 elected French Communists and allied members.

"Our line of conduct is based on three great positions which we made widely known during the election campaign and which, quite naturally, we hold today.

"In the first place, we intransigently defend the independence and sovereignty of France. In our opinion this is a position of principle that is valuable for all nations. We recognize for every country, as we demand for our own, the imprescriptible right to maintain control over its decisions--on national and international levels--and to speak with its own voice. For this reason we are opposed to any attempt to expand the powers of the European Assembly at the expense of the National Parliament.

"On this basic question we are the only political force in France--I really mean the only one--to express ourselves unambiguously and systematically make our actions agree with our words. That is our first position.

"In the second place we are in favor of any measure that is likely to advance social progress and democracy. For example, in our opinion social benefits should be adjusted upward and equal rights and salaries for men and women should be assured.

"At the same time we are fighting any measure that runs counter to the interests of our people and our country. That is the case with the "European" politicians of austerity, with industrial damage, agricultural waste, deterioration of the environment and waste of human potential. I want particularly to speak of those too-famous "plans" started by the "European commissioners" in close association with representatives of governments and multinational firms.

"In the same spirit, we favor democratizing European institutions. It is high time, for example, to ensure just representation in them for workers and their union organizations, as it is urgent to democratize the management of agricultural orientation funds and the Community's other financial instruments.

"Finally, we affirm in this Assembly our solidarity with the men and women who are struggling in Europe and in the world for a better life, freedom and dignity. For that reason we have supported the 100,000 Belgian workers who are demonstrating at Charleroi, to the steel workers who are fighting in the Ruhr, to the dockers who are "illegally" striking at the port of Rotterdam, or to the German civil servants who are victims of professional interdictions.

"All of this is what we call 'the Europe of social progress and democracy.' This is our second position.

"In the third place we want to contribute to the development of an equitable cooperation between sovereign nations. Such cooperation is desirable on the industrial, scientific, technologic levels, on the environmental protection level, on the cultural level.

"We are also in favor of initiatives allowing Europe to play a driving role in disarmament and the progress of the detente.

"Finally, we are fighting for a Europe free from United States guardianship, for dissolution of blocs, for setting up a new economic and political world order.

"This is the Europe we want. As you may realize, at the same time that it is fighting the Europe of the multinationals, of authoritarianism and alignment with American imperialism, the French Communist Party is devoting itself to promoting the progress of a positive concept of Europe: a Europe of social progress, democracy, cooperation and peace. In other words, a Europe of the peoples.

"You will find this concept explained in the "20 positions for Europe" that we adopted, the works we have published, the many articles we have devoted to these questions in our press and specialized journals as well as in the texts of our 23rd Congress.

"And it is this concept of Europe that we are bringing into play, in the field as well as in the tribunal of this Assembly.

"With us there is no double talk.

"I add--and this will be my last word--that within the common group they form in the European Assembly, French Communists and Italian Communists, as well as their allies, are developing--beyond their differences, which are well-known--a fraternal and fruitful association. We have every reason to be pleased with it and we have firmly decided to proceed along that path."

#### Before 150 Journalists [the press conference]

"One gets the feeling there is a certain chaos," Georges Marchais replied to a question about "the ambience" prevailing in the European Assembly. Problems are often dealt with there that would never concern the workers and the peoples, but much more important questions are also dealt with, along with the desire to impose by practice the fact that this Assembly has powers going back to the National Parliaments, in disregard of the Treaty of Rome. It is easy to see that everything is a pretext for trying to make us go forward along that road.

"That is why the French Communist deputies and their allies will exhibit extreme vigilance in preventing the nasty blows they intend to prepare for us."

Questioned on the socialists' attitude during the armament debate, Georges Marchais recalled on Sunday that he had mentioned, in connection with Europe 1, numerous examples of the double talk of the French Socialists. "Yesterday's armaments debate was eloquent from that point of view," he added. "In fact, the French Socialist Party is taking no clear position against expanding the jurisdiction of this Assembly and consequently no clear position against the march toward a new European defense community."

Georges Marchais emphasized that the French Communists and their allies voted neither for an RPR [Rally for the Republic] resolution nor for another one by the Socialist Party.

"On the one hand, because the RPR is in the majority and supports Giscard d'Estaing's policy, and on the other hand because the PS [Socialist Party] policy is ambiguous, in the sense that it is satisfied to affirm that it is not "opportune" to discuss these questions now."

The PS must take into account the strong opposition existing in our country, but at the same time it is in the act of preparing a new program that indicates, among other things, that the French dissuasion force should be used to defend Western Europe, that is, in favor of a new European defense community.

"In our new program, therefore, the PS is going entirely in the direction of what the integrationist forces want," Georges Marchais continued.

On the other hand, Sylvie Leroux, a Communist deputy, spoke before the Strasbourg Assembly, asking for an emergency discussion of the conflict involving French and British lobster fishermen. And what did the French Socialists do? "They voted with the British lords and bankers to prevent the debate. And this would have been a great opportunity to organize unity of action at the base in order to defend the interests of the French fishermen."

Asked about relations between the elected representatives of the PCF and the PCI in the European Assembly, Georges Marchais stated, "French and Italian Communists are in the habit of sticking to the language of truth. We have never concealed the fact that on certain questions affecting both the role and the prerogatives of the European Assembly there exist differences of position between our two parties. But we are also concerned--and yesterday's meeting with my friend Enrico Berlinguer confirmed this--, we are willing to search for common positions in all areas where there are differences between us.

"The debate on the armaments question, the speeches of each of us and the votes that followed, show that there is progress in that direction," Georges Marchais emphasized.

Moreover, "The initiatives decided upon by the two parties on the occasion of that meeting are incontestably destined to have great repercussions, not only on our country but at the international level," he concluded in answer to this question.

Asked about the problem of world hunger, briefly mentioned on Tuesday in the Assembly, the general secretary of the PCF replied, "We think this problem should be seriously examined by the European Assembly. Besides, the Community has duties to fulfill in this area, and the first would be to reestablish the aid to Vietnam which it has abolished. Because it is curious to see people speak of their concern for world hunger and at the same time not hesitate to discontinue the very meager aid that had been granted to Vietnam, aid that country really needs."

One cannot be content with "publicity operations" when world hunger is involved. This is a question that must be approached very seriously, in all its implications.

"To speak of it," Georges Marchais emphasized, "is to speak of the need for a new world economic order."

Then he mentioned four great principles on which this new order must rest: the countries that produce raw materials must be assured of remunerative and stable prices.

The old colonialist and neocolonialist order must be ended and economic relations must be established with the developing countries, based on equal rights and mutual advantage.

Those countries must be granted financial aid which will not be accompanied by political pressure intended to prevent the peoples from freely giving themselves the social regimes of their own choosing.

And the capitalist developed countries and all those with advanced knowledge of technology must stop wanting to keep it for themselves and must help the developing countries to get it; without it no progress is possible.

"So many countries are experiencing poverty, hunger and disease, while in countries like ours they are throwing diesel oil over hundreds of thousands of tons of fruits and vegetables, they are smashing the iron and steel industry, smashing the factories producing consumer goods.

"Those questions are all being raised with the world hunger problem," Georges Marchais concluded.

He then recalled the reasons why the PFC is firmly opposed to expanding the Common Market: it would not solve the problems confronting the EEC. It would also have extremely negative consequences for French workers and farmers. Finally, some people would like to take advantage of it to violate the Treaty of Rome and impose supranationality.

Georges Marchais recalled that the PCF was not alone in that analysis. The Greek Communist Party, the Greek Socialist Party, PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Union] and the Portuguese Communist Party all share this point of view.

Would forming a European army guarantee peace on the Rhine, as Mr Pflimlin stated in the European Assembly? "We do not share that opinion at all," George Marchais answered.

"We are very worried about the military power that Federal Germany already has at its disposal. Its conventional forces are much stronger than the forces at the disposal of the French army; moreover, that fact is not unrelated to the decision we have taken to maintain the dissuasion force, which we conceive of as a political asset for defending independence and sovereignty."

On the other hand, leading West German circles have not given up their claims with respect to the German Democratic Republic, "whose existence is an historic chance for France, the German people themselves, the European countries and the entire world," Georges Marchais stated.

In those circumstances the existence of a European army, giving Federal Germany access to the atomic weapon, would not in any case be a guarantee of peace. "There is no peace on the Rhine without peace on the Elbe."

Is there really any danger of a Franco-West German nuclear force being formed? "Indisputably," Georges Marchais replied. On the one hand the attitude of the Socialists on this subject is not clear; on the other hand, Mr Giscard d'Estaing has not said that France would oppose it, contenting himself with stating that she "will not propose" forming such a force; finally, a Giscardian, Mr Diligent, has just expressed pleasure that a new EDC [European Defense Community] is being discussed in the European Assembly.

"If some people in this affair are going ahead secretly, it is because the peoples are opposed to the arms race," Georges Marchais went on. He stated that the Communists were ready to ally themselves with all who want to further the cause of disarmament.

Concerning the events in the Central African Republic, he said he believed it was "difficult to see France mixed up in what is happening in that region of the world."

France might work very positively on the condition that it was done on the basis of respect for the right of nations to self-determination, and on the basis of a true cooperation.

"The Bokassa affair is tarnishing France," he added. It is good that Bokassa has been removed from power. But the French troops should withdraw from that country in such a way that the Central African people are free to decide their future for themselves.

Asked about the question of European Assembly headquarters, Georges Marchais said he believed that "France and the president of the Republic would do themselves a dishonor if they abandoned Strasbourg; that would be a new capitulation."

And if the headquarters were established elsewhere just the same, would Georges Marchais resign? "Never," he answered. "I do not resign before the battle."

#### The Marchais-Berlinguer Meeting

A meeting took place on Tuesday in Strasbourg between Enrico Berlinguer, general secretary of the PCI, and Georges Marchais, PCF general secretary. Also taking part were: Giorgio Amendola, member of the board of PCI and chairman of the Communist and allied group in the European Assembly; Giancarlo Pajetta, member of the PCI board and head of the international affairs department; Guido Fanti and Sergio Segre, members of the Central Committee of the PCI; and Comrades Maxime Gremetz, member of the Polit Bureau and secretary of the PCF, Gustave Ansart and Rene Piquet, members of the PCF Political Bureau.

During the meeting, which took place in a climate of friendship and cordiality, the need to continue the profitable association between the two parties and implement concrete initiatives was underlined.

The exchange of views dealt with the situation in both countries and the activity of both parties, as well as several aspects of the international situation and the situation of the labor movement. It brought to the fore a considerable convergence of views on basic problems.

Particular attention was paid to the need to continue the bilateral cooperation of the two parties, even while contributing to the development of common initiatives with the other workers' and democratic parties and liberation movements on the broad questions concerning Europe and the Mediterranean, as well as on broad world problems.

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## PCF POLITBURO CALLS FOR RELEASE OF CSSR DISSIDENTS, CITES MARCHAIS MOVES

LD251509 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 22 Oct 79 p 12 LD

[Apparent text of "PCF Politburo Statement"]

[Text] The trial of Vaclav Havel and other Czechoslovak citizens being prosecuted for their political activities which opens in Prague this Monday will certainly be a painful blow to French communists.

We appreciate the true value of the historic progress constituted by the suppression of capitalist exploitation in a socialist country such as Czechoslovakia and are aware of the results secured both in economic development and in the policy of social progress. That makes it easier for us to clearly state our opinion on any measure--such as this trial--which harms the development of socialist society, tarnishes its image and the ideal for which we communists are fighting.

Out of our unswerving attachment to the cause of respect for human rights and also out of a desire to help socialist Czechoslovakia overcome its problems we used all possible means to insure that there would be no trial and that Vaclav Havel and his companions would be liberated. Our action was guided by that objective alone.

In the past few months [PCF Secretary General] Georges Marchais approached CPCZ Secretary General Gustav Husak, on behalf of the PCF, and reaffirmed the PCF position and its urgent request for the release of the Czechoslovak citizens being prosecuted for their views; he also made several personal approaches in that connection to Czechoslovak representatives.

The trial now opening shows that, despite our repeated interventions, the Czechoslovak leaders have not heeded our request to abandon it and release the accused. We cannot accept that the vital political and ideological struggle should be replaced by trials and prison sentences.

We do not aspire to dictate to anybody the ways and means of building socialism, just as we cannot accept that our policy should be defined by somebody else.

Our defense of these Czechoslovak citizens, who we think are unjustly prosecuted, is based exclusively on the conviction--which we emphasized at our 23d congress--that in our days the development of democracy is a universal fact which is and should always be inherent in socialism.

The PCF Politburo considers that the acquittal of the accused is now the only step in keeping with justice and the interests of socialism.

[Dated] Paris, 21 October 1979.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FRENCH CP SECRETARY INTERVIEWED ON PRAGUE TRIAL, VISIT TO USSR

LD251748 Paris Domestic Service in French 0645 GMT 25 Oct 79 LD

[Interview with Charles Fiterman, secretary of the French Communist Party Central Committee by Joseph Paletou on "Let's Talk Straight" program, in Paris on 25 October--live]

[Excerpts] [Question] Charles Fiterman, we will talk about the statements made last night in "Facing the Public" program by Michel Poniatowski in a minute, but let us discuss two other topical issues, please, to begin with: The first, the attacks last night in Paris claimed by Corsican separatists. Do you condemn them?

[Answer] Absolutely. We categorically condemn them. But I would add that one cannot separate these phenomena from the serious problems facing Corsica with which I am familiar, and it must be said that from this point of view the government has been making lots of promises for a long time, but has resolved nothing. Well, the problems must be solved.

[Question] You have also condemned the Prague trial, and you are asking for the release of Havel and those who with him were sentenced for their views. Well, for all that, do you approve the French minister of foreign affairs having called off his forthcoming trip to Czechoslovakia?

[Answer] Yes, we categorically condemned these trials in Prague because we consider that they are absolutely contrary to the ideals of socialism, to what socialism should be and can be in the conditions of our time. It is absolutely intolerable, and it is absolutely abnormal because, today, socialism could give the world an advanced image, not only in economic and social matters, but also in the matter of democracy. Well, on the subject of Francois-Poncet, I would say that the French Government is not in a good position to give lessons on humanism, above all if one refers to their policy....

[Question] In a worse position than the Communist Party?

[Answer] Certainly. Above all, listen to me, Bokassa is no friend of ours; he never has been. Well, having said that, I would add that in my opinion Francois-Poncet should go to Prague all the same.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because there are more important issues at stake--that of peace, that of security in Europe--and one must work for that. And because anyway the development of relations of cooperation between countries is always favorable at all levels.

[Question] Charles Fiterman, might this trial in Prague not accelerate the advent of Eurocommunism, a more autonomous Eurocommunism in relation to Moscow and to the communist countries which are perpetuating Stalinist practices? Georges Marchais has already announced initiatives in that direction.

[Answer] Listen, people have said, people have repeated that Eurocommunism was dead. Eurocommunism is alive. We and a certain number of other parties in convergence and in parallel to our own are developing a policy tending to link closely socialism and freedom, and we are going to continue. It is true that some initiatives are planned and we hope that they will see the light of day in the near future.

[Question] When?

[Answer] But I would add that this development is not effected uniquely and essentially with reference to what is done in the existing socialist countries. What we are particularly concerned to do is to meet the real needs of this country, to find solutions which would allow us to get the country out of the serious difficulties it is in at the moment--the crisis--by starting from an analysis of the country. And that is what Eurocommunism is all about.

[Question] Denunciation of differences on the one hand, accentuation of convergencies on the other--what will your forthcoming trip to Moscow lead to? Simply an official visit to the USSR by Georges Marchais at the end of the year?

[Answer] Listen, on the subject of our party's relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, one must be clear. We have serious, profound differences with our Soviet comrades; we said this at our congress, and these differences still exist. But at the same time we also have great common objectives--(let me) just cite one, that of the struggle for disarmament, for peace which at the moment calls for important initiatives. So we will develop our relations within that framework: Being clear about our differences, but at the same time cooperating, making initiatives on everything we have in common and which is important. That is the framework within which to place this trip which constitutes a stage in the relations between us. You mentioned Georges Marchais' trip: Well, it is a very long time since there was a meeting between our two parties at the highest level. Consequently, it is a possibility, but no decision has been made yet.

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

'LE FIGARO': PCF OFFICIALS' TRIP AIMED AT PCF-CPSU 'RECONCILIATION'

LD161323 Paris LE FIGARO in French 13 Oct 79 pp 1, 5 LD

[Article by Michel P. Hamelet: "Marchais Wants Reconciliation With Brezhnev"]

[Text] L'HUMANITE for 10 October announces the arrival in Moscow of a PCF delegation headed by Charles Fiterman and Maxime Gremetz--both top-level officials (Secretariat)--and including party foreign policy section member Patrick Le Mahec. This delegation, L'HUMANITE adds, is to have "talks on questions of mutual interest" with the CPSU leaders.

This report lifts a corner of the veil over discussions which have been going on for several months and which are principally aimed at a "reconciliation meeting" between Georges Marchais and Leonid Brezhnev. The precise date will be fixed after the present bargaining. The PCF has apparently suggested December. It seems in a hurry to settle the matter. The remaining problem is the final drafting of the joint communique which would be published after these forthcoming "summit" talks.

Georges Marchais does not want to appear to be eating humble pie after the many declarations of independence he has made since his last meeting with Brezhnev during the June 1976 international conference of communist parties in Berlin. There was a "brush" between him and the Soviets at that time because the conference smacked of the cominform.

However, since then the Italian and Spanish parties have proved more astute. They have managed to maintain relations with Moscow while showing more formal independence than the PCF. It has therefore become necessary for the PCF--at a time when the USSR is scoring points on the international plane--to be reconciled with the big family. The problem is to find a satisfactory compromise. This could take the form of an announcement of PCF intervention for the release of certain dissidents--intervention which would meet with success.

The attitude adopted recently by Jean Elleinstein, who has resumed his open criticism of the "line" currently followed by his party, could be connected

with this move by Georges Marchais. Indeed, it would show the Soviets that diversity of opinion has become necessary within the communist parties. The Russians, like the French, would find advantages in recognizing that pluralism.

One effect of this attempt to "normalize" PCF-USSR relations could be to strengthen Roland Leroy in his post as L'HUMANITE chief editor; he is at present receiving rough treatment and on several occasions has advocated such a meeting between the French and Soviet leaders.

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## COMMUNIST ASSESSMENT OF HAVANA NONALINED CONFERENCE

Paris FRANCE NOUVELLE in French 15-21 Sep 70 pp 6-8

[Article by special envoy to Havana NAC, Pierre Martin: "The Sixth Summit's Outlook"]

[Text] A vast political rainbow comprised of nations already deeply involved in building socialism, such as Vietnam, Cuba and Yugoslavia, of systems like Kenya or Singapore, which are trying to stimulate capitalist-type growth, of countries given over to imperialist exploitation by their leaders--as is the case of Zaire and Gabon--and even autocratic and oppressive regimes (the Central African Empire is one example); intense, detailed debates which preceded 14 months of active consultation; the conference of nonaligned nations, held in Havana from 3 to 10 September, undeniably represents an important facet of international life and a prominent point in the already 18-year-old history of the movement.

#### Results are Positive

The fact that this sixth summit was held in Cuba in itself takes on an important meaning. The American leaders who took steps to wreck the Havana conference during the preparatory stage were aware of this; even during the conference itself, they stepped up pressures and acts of intimidation, going so far as to revive a cold war climate. Goaded by their imperialist protectors (and particularly by the Giscardian government), countries with conservative or reactionary sympathies were the most active in trying to bring about its failure. But the results are positive: nonaligned nations met in a greater number than ever before, in a country which is carrying on a socialist revolution amid the American continent and resolutely forging ahead with its anti-imperialist determination in its positions and actions. The active role played by the Cuban leaders during the summit's preparations contributed to the major problems facing the movement (with regard to its general trends, its vital goals, its stand on this or that critical issue) not being sidestepped, but being the subject of a comprehensive debate. The choice of Havana was also a revealing sign of the noticeable changes taking place in the new world and which are inseparable from the international influence of the Cuban experiment.

In the Caribbean, the political independence movement goes largely hand in hand with the demand for economic liberation. The future of dictatorial and oppressive regimes in the area has become more uncertain, as evidenced by the victory of patriotic and popular forces in Nicaragua. There are more countries which are inclined, in varying degrees, to stand aloof from American power. The participation of Latin American and Caribbean nations in the nonaligned movement is becoming broader and more active.

The firmly anti-imperialist tone of several speeches, particularly those of the representatives of Vietnam, Mozambique and Madagascar, met with great response in the conference hall of the Cuban capital. Finally, it is not an unimportant fact that for the next 3 years, i.e., until the seventh summit to be held in Baghdad in 1982, the movement's presidency has been entrusted to the Cuban chief of state. We recall how much President Houari Boumediene's personality and active participation helped to increase the movement's influence and initiative abilities following the fourth Algiers summit in 1973, particularly through the impetus given to action for a new international order.

Within the scope of the main lines of action determined during the sixth summit and with the support of the coordination department, there is no doubt that Cuba's presidency can be a significant contribution to breathing new life into the movement. Cuba's determination in the face of imperialism, its devotion to the ideals of independence and national sovereignty, justice, social progress, liberty, the interest shown by this country in everything capable of promoting peaceful coexistence, understanding and cooperation among nations can be a great contribution.

#### A Profound Indicator

At least as much as the location, the political time at which this sixth summit occurred is fraught with significance. The international system of imperialism and domination has recently experienced new divisions: under different circumstances and with future prospects which have not yet taken clear shape, the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, the ouster of the shah in Iran and the challenging of entire aspects of the American economic and military establishment in that country, represent serious setbacks for imperialism. In southern Africa and in Western Sahara, peoples struggling for their freedom are making notable gains. Countries most under the sway of imperialism, in which dictatorial and oppressive regimes are established, are being shaken by the emergence of broad and powerful movements of social and political protest. Neocolonialist structures of domination and stealing, such as those set up right after independence, are crumbling. In a growing number of countries--Algeria, Angola as well as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Madagascar and many others--profound economic and social changes, development of democracy and commitment to socialism in various original forms are under way. It has also become possible to make progress in regard to peace, disarmament and security, as evidenced by the final phase of SALT II negotiations on strategic arms limitations.

At the same time, imperialism is working hard to close the gaps, to rearrange its exploitative structures, to launch counterattacks against peoples and their aspirations for sovereignty and building a new life. In the Near East, the American government is trying to make a separate peace between Egypt and Israel and suppression of the Palestinian people's legitimate national demands the pivotal points of a new, imperialistic order in that part of the world. In southern Africa, the main imperialist countries are relying on the racist regime of South Africa to weaken and, if possible, to eliminate the liberation movements (SWAPO of Namibia, Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, National South African Congress) embodying the patriotic resistance of those peoples. During the Tokyo economic summit at the end of June, the seven most powerful imperialist countries demonstrated this spirit of counterattack, revealing their determination to block the economic sovereignty demands of African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean countries, even alluding to the prospect of armed intervention. During major international negotiations, particularly at the time of the fifth UN Conference for Trade and Development held in Manila during May and June, developed capitalist countries also tried to form a bloc. Not only did they systematically ignore (which was also the case in the setting of the multilateral tariff and trade negotiations of the Tokyo Round) the demands submitted by developing countries, but they even went so far as to reconsider certain points which had previously been the subject of agreements.

#### A Need for Unity

The belligerence of imperialism and the forms which it assumes (destabilization efforts, attempts to break up national movements, stirring up divisions among nonaligned countries and developing countries, multinational redeployment, currency manipulations, financial pressures, neo-trade protectionism . . . ) are keenly felt.

Whereas the crisis was present only in the background and was only of secondary importance at the time of the fifth Colombo summit in 1976, it was in the forefront of the debates, in a new and explicit way, during the Havana summit. The result was a feeling of urgency, a need for unity concerning vital goals. A real effort has been made to measure the extent of the crisis; to identify it basically as a crisis of imperialism; to clearly point out its negative aspects (it can spread dissension among nations whose main interests are nevertheless in agreement; it can make peoples lose hope in the outcome of their struggles); to strengthen the common will to deal with it and to stimulate renewed initiatives by nonaligned nations, particularly in action for a new international political and economic order. Even if this assessment of the crisis appears subdued and toned down in the final resolution, the result of a compromise among various national positions, it is significant that such a debate began.

Another feature which distinguished the Havana summit also lies in the extent and intensity of the discussions held. In itself, the existence of political and ideological debates within the movement is not a new phenomenon: during the first Belgrade conference in 1961, lively exchanges took

clarification concerning the positions to be adopted. The 1973 Algiers conference was a time of a clash of viewpoints between Libyan President Qaddafi and Fidel Castro in regard to "dual imperialism." It should also be noted that within such a large intergovernmental organization, which brings together nations with divergent and heterogeneous social and political orientations, the definition of joint positions and compromise solutions, with a view to action, can result only from detailed discussions and consultation.

#### Extension of Area of Debate

What also appears characteristic of this sixth summit, however, is the extension of the political and ideological area of this debate (which simultaneously involved the movement's basic principles, its fundamental positions, the formulation of its vital goals and the attitude to be adopted concerning special but sensitive issues, such as Kampuchea and the Near East). There is also the fact that almost all of the participants engaged in this debate. In several respects, a consensus managed to form without any great difficulties: no change was made in the scope of the movement's structures and operation. Solidarity with southern African countries was expressed in a clear program of action. There was broad political support for the fight of the Saharan people. The goals of the action of nonaligned countries to promote and make detente universal, to stop the arms race, to contribute to the democratization of international relations, particularly within the framework of the United Nations, were strengthened and clearly defined. The debates focused mainly on four major topics: definition of the movement's positions, representation of Kampuchea, the Near East question, adoption of a program of economic action.

With regard to positions, the discussions tended to center on two proposals submitted in opposing or even antagonistic terms: one emphasizing non-alignment as a position independent of blocs, the other stressing the fundamentally anti-imperialist nature of the movement. The compromise proposals adopted in the final statement tended to express very mildly the effort made toward ideological clarification, which is not surprising since it was a matter of formulating a statement capable of obtaining the support of everyone. The movement's specific and original independent role was reaffirmed. The matter at the heart of the discussions was to establish the common will of the movement, its unity of action concerning vital goals of a progressive, anti-imperialist nature, while making it clear that each nation has the right to determine its own political and social positions in complete sovereignty and beyond any guardianship or subordination. Stressing the independent nature of the movement does not mean that it stands aloof from the class confrontations bringing the movement for political and social liberation into conflict with imperialism on an international scale. On the contrary, it seems important to clearly define the movement's place among all forces of social change operating in the world, whether in developed capitalist countries, in countries in which socialism is being built or in areas of national liberation.

Regarding the issue of Kampuchea, which was one of the summit's most crucial concerns, the claim of the deposed and criminal Pol Pot regime to attend the Havana conference and to secure condemnation of Vietnam was rejected. Some countries supported it in the name of the principles of non-interference and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of nations. Others, particularly the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries (with Singapore and Malaysia adopting an openly aggressive attitude toward Vietnam), were motivated by the cold self-interest of realpolitik and reflected the outside pressures bent on creating an obstructive situation, on this issue in particular. The compromise solution adopted (the seat will remain vacant pending a reexamination of the issue) caused unhappiness among several delegations, particularly from Africa and the Caribbean, who demonstrated that in their eyes nothing justified the decision to reject the presence of Democratic Kampuchea as a member nation.

The Near East was another problem which was the subject of the most extensive and liveliest confrontations. Besides the development of support for the national struggle of the Palestinian people, it also involved defining a joint position of the movement on the Camp David agreements, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and Egypt's policy in the area. At the instigation of the PLO, the group considered the question of temporarily suspending Egypt from the movement. But the intended objective was to obtain a firm moral condemnation of the Sadat government, which was achieved despite the efforts made in favor of the latter by several African countries, especially those influenced by the Giscardian government (Gabon, Zaire, Senegal, Togo, Ivory Coast . . . ). If the necessity of giving a new impetus, based on solid and precise goals, to joint action for economic independence was widely demonstrated, it appeared that adoption of a platform of demands at the conference itself was premature. Opposition among nonaligned oil-importing and -exporting countries has to be overcome. It has been acknowledged that the development of cooperation among developing countries in the area of raw materials and energy could constitute a starting point for the materialization of "collective autonomy," i.e., expansion of economic and technical relations among developing countries. At the same time, an appeal was made to strengthen the unity which had tended to dissolve as a result of the crisis and divisive efforts of imperialism and to adopt joint nonaligned positions in major negotiations with a view to fairer, more balanced and more stable relations among nations, i.e., toward a new international economic order.

#### Meeting of Hopes, Struggles, Ideas

Beyond the focal points around which the political and ideological debate crystallized, an overall evaluation leads to wondering about the forces within the movement, i.e., in short, about its development as a vast and heterogeneous assembly of nations with an appreciable positive influence on international life.

First of all, it appears that the movement's social and political differentiation is becoming more pronounced. Reactionary, conservative countries

seem less and less inclined to play a passive or unobtrusive role. They seem determined to coordinate and to concert their positions. This became apparent through the attitude adopted by the ASEAN countries or that of African nations united around French imperialism. Regional groups (the Latin American group and African group in particular) are playing a more prominent role. Groups of a political nature are also forming, such as the Andean Pact. The action of associates of the Socialist International is also becoming more noticeable. It varies according to the situation.

Some of its representatives, such as Senghor, are openly trying to block the growth of anti-imperialist feelings within the movement. Others (this is particularly the attitude of the Jamaican Manley and of other Caribbean and Latin American representatives) have come to terms with this growing feeling and, by associating it with the positions which they have taken, put themselves in a position to influence and modify it. Finally, unlike what happened during the fifth Colombo summit in 1976, several progressively oriented countries appear to be willing to play an active, leading role to put an end to the relative lull which the movement experienced in the last period. In general, class divisions are tending to become more obvious.

Second, it should be noted that these divisions may be obscured by differences or clashes of opinion. These differences may concern the very nature of the movement and its basic positions, as well as special problems. In order to evaluate them, it is essential to consider the complicating factors currently affecting international life. The movement's intergovernmental nature should also be taken into account.

Third, it is important not to deemphasize the inherent contradictions in the movement and which are largely responsible for its setbacks and advances. As pointed out, it is an organization of nations, which results in emphasis being placed on coexistence, the broadest cooperation regardless of social and ideological orientation, and cohesion. But at the same time, the movement is becoming rooted in the struggles for political and social liberation of peoples, which implies anti-imperialist action and solidarity.

Fourth, in both its definition and its origins, the nonaligned movement basically expresses the demands of Asian, African, Latin American and Caribbean countries, formerly colonized and politically dependent, but determined today to assert their sovereignty in all areas. At the same time, the concepts of nonalignment (i.e., affirmation of national status, rejection of all allegiance and all guardianship, action to promote peace and detente, the demand for fairer and more equitable democratic relations among nations, i.e., for a new international order) correspond to the great aspirations of our time and take on a universal character.

Finally, if the effort toward ideological clarification is necessary for overall progress, it can only be a slow, complex and contradictory process

in such a heterogeneous intergovernmental organization with such a diversity of classes.

In brief, it may be said that this sixth summit has been an exceptional political and ideological meeting point--a meeting of nations, but also a meeting of hopes, struggles and ideas. Beyond its differences and disagreements, good conditions appear to exist for the movement to restore its unity of action and its initiative abilities.

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CSO: 3100

## 'L'HUMANITE' : ITES ON 'DEMOCRATIC REQUIREMENT INHERENT IN SOCIALISM'

LD191021 *Précis L'HUMANITE in French 6 Oct 79 p 5 LD*

[Article by Bernard Vasseur: "Democratic Requirement"]

[Text] The 23d PCF congress gave much thought to present-day socialism. It assessed positively the results of the activities of the socialist countries' historical movement for both their own peoples and all mankind. It also recalled that this judgment, which is completely consistent with the 23d congress' policy, did not mean that our analysis of the negative events which occurred or are still occurring in socialist countries has been either modified or toned down.

Georges Marchais stated: "Generally speaking, we have been prompted to take the view and state that problems resulting from 'a failure to recognize the universal democratic requirement inherent in socialism' have arisen in socialist countries."

This analysis, and especially the formula which represents its essence, deserves special attention. In fact, though it is not completely original, it can impress because of its newness and clarity. How should it be understood and what are its implications?

#### Rejection of Models

You could be tempted to add this formula to a list of universal features which serve to determine the concept of socialism. On the whole, according to any a priori definition, socialism would mean always and everywhere (universally, in the sense of the word as used in classical logic), first, establishment of collective ownership of means of production and exchange, second...and so forth--plus the democratic requirement. In short, it would be a concept composed of a number of features determining an unchanging essence--socialism determined once and for all. Equipped with this concept as a magnifying glass, you would merely have to stroll through history with a view to recognizing here and there (or nowhere) a reality consistent with the above definition--"inherent," as they say, in the definition.

It can immediately be perceived that it is impossible to proceed in this way. For how should this list be decided and where should it end? And how can you "include" historical reality, which is movement and transformation, in a definition whose features are static and are imparted to it once and for all? It is easy to see how difficult it is to define democracy in this way since it would be necessary to confine it to the political sphere and reduce it to just one of its aspects, making it a form of state providing for the existence and functioning of certain legal and political institutions and opposed to some other forms (dictatorship, monarchy and so forth). In fact, democracy as we understand it is not confined to the political sphere because the term indicates a historical process which is at the heart of socialism in all its dimensions--political, certainly, but also economic and social. It indicates, in the form of a historical trend, the ability of men and peoples to take conscious and active charge of their own destiny--that is, "The participation of individual and social groups on an increasingly large scale and in a creative and qualified manner in the management and administration of society within the framework of unimpeded enjoyment of all individual and collective fundamental freedoms" (G. Marchais, 23d congress).

As we can see, that is a much more fruitful analysis than any mere collection of features determined a priori and comprising an unchangeable concept. Another, equally mistaken, way of understanding "the universal democratic requirement inherent in socialism" would consist of saying: Democratic socialism is the French communists' specific strategy made universal for a particular occasion. Thus by referring to the "universal democratic component of socialism," French communists would merely elevate their strategy to the status of a model dogmatically represented as universally valid. Thus because of a fatal trick of history we would criticize "Stalinism" while preserving its methods.

In fact, refusing both to "import" a model and "export" its own strategy as a model, the PCF has rejected this very theoretical move which would lead to the appearance of a model. This is an important decision if ever there was one, and we should develop it in depth.

#### A Fundamental Trend

In fact, what does the idea of a model imply? It means that history can be reduced to a single evolutionary scheme and that there exists a universal historical law relating to the destiny of mankind, which has to progress through certain states. In short, an uneventful kind of history--since it is only a question of following suit--mapped out in advance along a path of linear evolution where diversity conditions are deemed to be a negligible quantity.

Breaking away from this kind of schematic outlook is tantamount to modifying the concept of social laws, to understanding the diversity of peoples' social experience and specific living conditions without eliminating it and

to asserting that "socialism is bound to originate and develop as a specific answer to every country's concrete needs." However, this approach, which draws sustenance from every country's specific reality, does not render superfluous the highlighting of the "general features" of the "general laws" of socialism (but in a completely different sense from that which I mentioned at the beginning). It is merely necessary to agree on what we understand by the word "generality" by noting for instance:

First, that as far as social laws are concerned, not everything belongs to the same sphere and that analyses show that there are different degrees of generality.

Second, that it is impossible to dissociate these general laws from multi-form experience and the specific diversity of situations whose unity they make it possible to consider.

Third, that these general laws, which can in no way be dissociated from the specificity of the social experiences which they enable us to consider, are in no way rigid but, on the contrary, are historically relative.

And, fourth, that it is impossible to deduce any concrete strategy from these general laws. For instance, the statement that power in the hands of the working class and its allies is a general feature of socialism does not indicate what concrete form this power, its possession and its transformation will assume in the socialist system which we want to build in France.

#### Putting an End to "Prehistory"

Does this mean that it must be said that the democratic requirement of socialism is one of its main features? Undoubtedly. And this implies that it is not in the name of an abstract concept of socialism or a kind of socialism imagined by us that we criticize certain practices in any specific socialist country. We criticize them in the name of existing socialism itself, in the name of what has emerged from the historical movement of these countries in the past 60--or less--years as a fundamental trend. Thus democracy is a requirement of socialism itself which includes among others--without being reduced to them--two following "general features": Abolition of private ownership of the main means of production and exchange and the power of the working class and its allies.

However, this universal requirement can be given a different and even more fundamental meaning since the democratic requirement is not now a requirement of socialism alone. As a result of socialism, among other things, it has become a universal requirement of mankind's historical movement. This is real universality. Here you no longer put yourself at the level of present-day socialism but at that of history seen as a development of mankind in which socialism currently constitutes "the most advanced stage."

At this point it would be a good thing if we could develop what Marx has merely outlined. It is capitalism that has given history its worldwide dimension by creating a world market, universalizing (in a contradictory manner) capital as the most advanced form of social wealth, eliminating, as a result, local and national characteristics and barriers inherited from the past and so forth, but also by producing its negation--a working class which as a "universal class" no longer has to try to win acceptance for any specific interest (inasmuch as any successful struggle on its part to eliminate class antagonisms would lead to its own elimination).

It is only under these conditions that a history of mankind (universal history) becomes possible--the Russian revolution of 1917 heralded not only the building of socialism in a specific country but also the era of mankind's progress toward socialism.

In this sense the democratic requirement inherent in socialism is indeed universal--since it concerns the universal future of all mankind, it concerns us also. The democratic requirement is universal thanks in part to existing socialism inasmuch as this represents the possibility of a history completely and consciously mastered by mankind itself and, in this sense, of completely democratic social life.

Criticizing the "persistent failure to recognize" this requirement in any specific socialist country is tantamount to criticizing it in the name of what socialism--together with some other forces--has developed among all mankind, in the name of the meaning which socialism has powerfully helped impart to the history of mankind by venturing to end mankind's "prehistory" and the huge historical sum total of the division of society into classes.

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## 'L'HUMANITE' REJECTS CRITICISM OF EUROCOMMUNISM BY CPSU'S PONOMAREV

LD251551 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 20 Oct 79 p 6 LD

[Article by PCF Central Committee member Maxime Gremetz: "On the Subject of Eurocommunism"]

[Text] According to TASS, CPSU Central Committee secretary and Politburo member Boris Ponomarev discussed the question of Eurocommunism in a lecture delivered in Moscow last Wednesday. In that speech B. Ponomarev compared Eurocommunism to "deviationism" with regard to "proletarian internationalism" and also affirmed that "the communist parties' leaderships are beginning to understand that Eurocommunism undermines the international communist movement and those parties themselves."

We do not dispute the right of Boris Ponomarev, or any other communist party leader, to express his opinion, however, critical, on such a question. That is part of the frank debate which exists in the communist movement on a series of problems--a debate which the PCF has long encouraged.

As far as we are concerned, we have stated our position on Eurocommunism very clearly on several occasions. In that connection our unanimous 23d congress stressed 5 months ago: "We attach great importance to the fact that our approach has coincided with that of other communist parties in capitalist countries, which have placed the development of democracy at the center of the paths to socialism which they propose for their respective countries. That convergence has been described as Eurocommunism."

Therefore Boris Ponomarev is mistaken when he says that "the communist party leaderships are beginning to understand that Eurocommunism undermines the communist movement and those parties themselves." On the contrary, we are deeply attached to what Eurocommunism represents and we consider that it is alive and well and has a future.

Nor is it fair to see Eurocommunism as an obstacle to the development of internationalist solidarity. As far as the PCF is concerned, its daily activities show that solidarity is a permanent aspect of its struggle. Moreover, it fulfills that duty with honor. Indeed the French communists

are in the vanguard of solidarity, be it solidarity with Vietnam and Cambodia, Uruguay, the Palestinians, the POLISARIO Front, Southern Africa....

It is only natural that this question and others in which positions differ should be debated in public, because it is a good thing for the relations between communist parties to be based on frankness and clarity.

For example, at our congress we voiced our differences with certain communist parties on the role and content of democracy in building and developing socialism.

In our view that is not an obstacle to cooperation and internationalist solidarity between communist parties--for example, we advocate joint initiatives for disarmament--based on mutual respect for the lines chosen by each party. Any ambiguity in this sphere would be likely to harm the necessary development of good cooperation.

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**JEAN COLPIN EMPHASIZES PCF ACTIVISM AMONG IMMIGRANT WORKERS**

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 24 Sep 79 p 6

[Text] Yesterday in Drancy more than 1,000 French workers, chiefly immigrants, took part with their families in the traditional meal of solidarity and struggle organized annually by the PCF on the day following the L'HUMANITE Festival. This demonstration, the 24th of its kind, took place in the presence of Jean Colpin, Central Committee secretary, Maurice Niles, deputy mayor of Drancy, Jean Garcia, senator and secretary of the Seine-St. Denis Federation and Jean Fabre, who is the present head of the immigration sector of the Central Committee\*.

Twenty-one immigrant workers joined the PCF at the gathering, indicating a strong awareness of the community of interests of French and immigrant workers, and the necessity for them to respond together to all attacks aimed at the entire working class of France.

Beyond the traditional dances and songs bursting forth one after the other in the four corners of the room, the deep interest of the immigrant workers in their native countries was shown especially in the attentiveness that marked the faces of the immigrants concerned when Jean Colpin saluted the memory of Agostinho Neto, demanded the arrest of the assassin Bokassa and mentioned the privileged relations the PCF maintains with Algeria, or the joint action of French and Italian Communist deputies in the European Parliament.

Numerous associations made up of immigrants or concerned with immigration attended the meal, as well as associates of the immigrant manpower sector of the Central Committee and immigration leaders from the PCF federations of the Parisian region.

Said Gerbi and Amir Tahar represented the Association of Algerians in France, and Bernard Guillard the Episcopal Migrations Commission (Catholic Church).

\* [Footnote missing]

In his speech Jean Colpin saluted the participation of the immigration section of the Central Committee in the L'HUMANITE Festival, where "we have seen tens of thousands of immigrants in 'their' festival, which today presents the real image of the working class, of the people of France, in its diversity and its unity, in its force and its vitality, in its determination to fight, as well."

Mentioning the government's and employers' attacks on workers as a whole, Jean Colpin then mentioned those directed at immigrant workers in particular. "Demonstrations and racist and fascist crimes are increasing and remain un-punished, as witnessed again by the assassination of Pierre Goldman, after so many others. The government favors the rebirth of the ideologies of the extreme right. It seeks to impose a repugnant climate of insecurity, of xenophobia, of racism, of persecution; what is happening in the metro, in public places, is a disgrace to our country."

Repression is growing stronger against the battles the workers are fighting in business firms and residents are fighting at home. The Barre and Stoleru bills reach a summit of ignominy. They trample on the rights achieved by immigrants, they violate international agreements and bilateral treaties (Franco-Algerian accord of 1968).

"These bills directly threaten several hundred immigrants, especially Algerians and Africans, but every individual immigrant, regardless of age or nationality, is their target."

Jean Colpin then recalled the depth of emotion brought on by the announcement of these measures and the retreats the government was forced to make: "But the danger remains," he reminded us, "because the discussion of the villainous laws is going to start up again in the government. They could be--they must be--prevented from passing."

Recalling that "as always, the government strikes at the poorest first, and seeks to intimidate all workers in order to divide them," Jean Colpin called for a redoubling of vigilance and efforts to put a stop to this policy.

"There is no way other than to fight. There are no means other than united struggle among the workers, French and immigrant. As our 23rd Congress strongly emphasized, it is in their union at the base, especially in business firms, that the workers will find the way to success and victories.

"We call for a fight against the villainous laws, for the renewal of residence permits. Immigrants have acquired claims and rights by virtue of their work and their participation in national life. They must be able to decide in total freedom whether to remain or not to remain in France, to keep their nationality or request naturalization. There could be no justification for suppressing their freedom of choice.

"And if we have said that we are in favor of stopping any new immigration, it is because in the crisis into which big capital is plunging us any increase in manpower would obviously aggravate the situation for everyone, to the advantage of the government and the employers.

"We are fighting for rights for immigrant workers equal to the rights of their French comrades, especially for the right to the same family allowances for those whose families live in this country, and we are the only party to have expressed this demand.

"We are fighting in business for the right to work, equal pay, improved working conditions, political and labor union rights. We are fighting in the residential ghettos to force Sonacotra and the government to negotiate for abolition of rent increases, against evictions and seizures, for improved housing and democratization of home life.

"We are fighting against neighborhood ghettos, to impose on the government the release of the means necessary to enable the immigrant population to be distributed in a more balanced way, especially in cities where reactionary and racist city councils are refusing to welcome them.

"We are fighting these battles at the grass roots," concluded Jean Colpin, "by ruling out any form of class collaboration, we are fighting them in the light, which means we must denounce the Socialist Party for double dealing--on immigration questions, as on others. We are likewise fighting any form of irresponsible adventurism, cutting the workers off from the population. This means we must denounce the leftists and the Coordinating Committee.

"Both are making a mistake, dividing the workers and playing the power game."

Before concluding he recalled the principal analyses and proposals of the PCF with respect to immigration contained in the democratic immigration statute filed before the holidays in the National Assembly by the Communist deputies.

In his speech Jean Colpin also paid homage to Charles Barontini, who has been in charge of this sector for 28 years and who requested that for health reasons he be relieved of that responsibility.

Jean Colpin saluted "the competence, the sense of responsibility, the sense of camaraderie, and above all the Party spirit" of Charles Barontini.

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## PSU REEXAMINES EFFECTIVENESS OF SELF-MANAGEMENT CONCEPT

Paris TRIBUNE SOCIALISTE in French Sep-Oct 79 pp 29-31

[Article by Pierre Naville]

[Text] During the entire past month, the press was principally preoccupied with drawing up the "scorecard" of Barre's 3 years of government. The majority has evoked some growling from the Chirac quarter. But...who has anything better to say? As for the left, it notes mainly that Barre "is managing the crisis" quite astutely to the profit of the big capitalist enterprises--which is true--but all in all the left remains on the defensive.

Looking ahead, everyone is thinking about the only election opportunity in sight, namely that of the presidential elections in the spring of 1981. But what does that prove? That in the thinking of the PS [Socialist Party] as well as of the PCF [Communist Party] every serious attack against the Giscard-Barre government continues to be linked with an election tactic, to an election conquest of political power. It is precisely this tactic which caused the left to fail in 1976....

All of a sudden, "social programs" for now are being contracted. The mass of workers are exhibiting a spirit of resistance to the effects of the economic crisis which, for the moment, does not go beyond that point. The CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] and the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] have understood moreover that their objective cannot for the moment by anything other than a mobilization to react against rising prices, obtain wage increases, decrease hours and rates of work, oppose layoffs and demand the establishment of jobs.

If one wishes to envisage a period of more forceful action, it is necessary that this barrage against the reinforced system of exploitation, both in the private and public sectors, be increasingly stepped up. Strikes and divers on the job struggles can have only this objective today.

For the moment, the CGT, like the FO [Workers Force], CFDT and FEN [National Education Federation] on their own way, wish to force the government to open a series of negotiations branch by branch, a means of facilitating the necessary mobilization. That leads to a strategy of contractual defense;

however, even that cannot succeed unless it finds an impetus and echo in vigorous worker struggles, such as that of the steel and iron industry in the spring.

However, this is the moment that the PS has chosen to once again undertake the study of its "social program." What we know about it up to now gives us an inkling of a few generalities which commit to nothing other than the reshaping of party unity around a presidential candidacy. Decidedly, tomorrow will not see the "enterprises" sector take the actions we continually wish from it in this regard.

As for the PCF, it has the advantage of having an important union team: the CGT. That is what is forcing Marchais to temper his attitude to facilitate the policy of negotiations demanded by Seguy, while doing everything he can to help unleash important struggles, which alone are capable of giving impetus to useful negotiations.

For the PSU it is time to submit its self-management perspective to examination, for we must recognize the fact that in the present circumstances it is not so easy to perceive what in practice is involved.

#### The Self-Management Label

Let us ignore those persons for whom the word self-management is a kind of innocuous label. We find this in all the motions of the PS at the Metz Congress; we have found it in some PCF speeches; even the Giscardians have referred to it here and there. Of course we find mention of it in the philosophical speeches of certain intellectual quarters. Let us remember only that in the CFDT the word is taken seriously and that it is linked with the defense of party demands, in particular those concerning working conditions, the establishment of hourly rates or systematic wage scales.

These different ways of speaking about self-management prove that the term is susceptible of many interpretations. A bit like the word "democracy," or "socialism," which can cover all sorts of merchandise.

Doubtless it is up to the PSU to make an effort to define in a concrete way, in the present circumstances, what is to be understood by self-management struggle. Otherwise, the PSU, too, would be doing nothing other than engaging in modish chatter without relevance to events.

In the first place, to what should the self-management perspective be applied with priority? If we judge by numerous comments, it applies to everything, just like "democracy." To wage-earning labor, as well as to consumption, to private and public life, to household activities as well as to recreation, to games, to sports. To health as well as teaching and education, to the theatre, it matters little to me whether it is self-managed. But everyone is forced to go to work in one way or another, or to live at the expense of others.

On the whole, as regards the activity and objectives of a party such as the PSU, or of a union, the self-management concept must above all be a way of looking at the conditions of wage-earning labor, from every standpoint.

This does not mean that "cultural" life, for example, everything connected with information (press, publishing, meetings, media, etc), does not have importance, of course. On the contrary, it is essential. However, these aspects of cultural life in the final analysis depend upon the conditions of productive labor and upon its value in purchasing power in terms of wages, as we are living in a system of exchanges expressed in money.

It is not by chance that the heads of private enterprises, private or public, and the government reject anything which might involve bringing self-management measures into labor while they engage in a considerable amount of demagogic games, festivals and the arts. They think that in culture self-management is innocuous because of their authority and decision-making capabilities. That is precisely why it should be introduced into the labor sector on a priority basis.

Their way out is "dialog" and negotiation. Barre and Giscard are always talking about them; however, it is only to get a feeling for changing forces. "Nationalizations" have not greatly changed things up to now, with the exception of a few cooperative guarantees; e.g., for government workers and personnel with status. Moreover it is in this public sector (stripped in theory of the private hypothesis) that the self-management struggle could push the furthest, through extension of the powers of the Establishment Committees. In other words, it is precisely out of the rank and file; i.e., the mass of workers, that the self-management objectives should come.

#### Development of Control

Action, therefore, should begin in all possible forms with labor and wage-earner control. The present work site or enterprise committees are only an embryonic form. The unions cannot reserve it to themselves. This is an inescapable stage; it is a force of proposal and action: control in order to manage continues to be our watchword. Without the control stage, waiting for parliamentary decisions is the path of passivity.

Therefore, it becomes necessary to know what the rank and file units of a self-management power might be. First, it is necessary that the units be permanent, stable and limited groups which over the long-term can apply their own decisions. Self-management does not operate in the clouds.

To put it another way, how are the rank and file units to be limited and how is their activity to be coordinated? How is the autonomy of these units to be reconciled with the need for cooperation among them? In a small enterprise of 40 or 50 persons, the situation is quite easily conceivable.

The same would be true of a private association of volunteers. However, what about big enterprises which have thousands, tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of persons? Let us consider the EDF [French Electric Power Company] and the SNCF [French National Railroads]. Their interconnected network stretches throughout the country; all the elements are unified. At what level can control and self-management be exercised and in what forms? And what about the school system (the largest item in the state budget)? Can the schools, at least at the secondary level, be self-managed with complete independence?

It is a question in that instance of limitations which in a way are geographic, in space. But how do we reconcile the rights and demands of the producers and those of the users who are one and the same persons? This dichotomy poses formidable problems in Yugoslavia, in the banking system for example. The state or private banks hold the funds of enterprises, establishments and private savers. If personnel working in these banks are self-managed, would they participate in the handling of the funds of the bank's clients?

Let us go a step further: how will the self-managed units reconcile the needs and demands presented by the different categories of the population? How will these needs be designated and evaluated and at what level? The ecology movement, like the PSU, has brought up a number of essential problems on this score, at the heart of which is the problem of energy. How should the self-management procedures be approached today? By referendum and arbitration among party needs?

Those are the kinds of real problems by which a self-management perspective is confronted and which we do not have the right to leave up in the air. The answer is often given that things should be done in "another way," a mythical term which the Giscardians have taken up for their own purposes. There is talk of "another" growth, of a "different" program, etc. However, how are they to be concretely defined without linking quantity to quality?

#### First Evaluate Needs

For the moment, that boils down to envisaging the inevitable combination of self-management and a new way of planning. Today, the parties of the left only see the question from the perspective of "dismantling," as if in France there was an effective and controlled system of planning, while the fact is that we are living in a system of liberal capitalist monopolies; i.e., free to act as they wish, with the reservation of corrective action by the state (and not by planning organizations).

For its part, the PCF believes that nationalization, state ownership, is the answer for everything, after the Russian model. All of a sudden, self-management would be reduced to nothing. wage earners and unions would merely approve bureaucratic decisions often worse than managerial fluctuations.

As for our part, we know very well that any system of planning by specific objectives must at one and the same time be experimental and mandatory:

experimental precisely because it must combine with various forms of self-management being tried and mandatory because it must be possible to judge one's predicted results. But its first stage must be that of the evaluation of needs, incompatible with the anarchic liberalism of the marketplace advocated by the economists of FIGARO other others.

In other words, when there is talk of "another growth," of "another economic logic," either these are hollow words or else they are the elaboration of a concrete model for the evaluation of needs. This immense task is not usefully fulfilled anywhere, not even in planned economies of the Russian kind. It comes back to the supporters of a self-management economy to take up this task immediately and to begin to establish a methodology for this evaluation.

What kinds of needs have to be satisfied? In what order or priority? To what degree are they more or less necessary and chancy, more or less collective and individual? It would be futile to imagine that such questions can be resolved by means of simple questionnaires. All forms of consumption are on trial (permanent or occasional consumption, of durable or expendable goods, etc). That is an area where public control and consumer associations play an increasingly important role vis-a-vis the production system.

We also see quite well that coordination of planning and self-management poses problems of hierarchy. In this sector, it is not enough to cut down inequalities of wages or incomes. Certainly, it is necessary to raise the inter-occupational minimum growth wage relatively to the average wage and to cut down the higher wages, eliminate job disparities (women, immigrants). However, it is also necessary to understand that real equality of incomes does not perfectly create an equality of function, not in labor or outside of labor. Even from the technical viewpoint, practical management and the administration of enterprises and services create certain logical orders of execution. This technical orderliness promotes human hierarchical structuring resulting in inequalities of income.

#### A European Question

What self-management must, therefore, come to grips with is this connection. It is necessary to separate remuneration from function, decrease the scale of coefficients, results of a division of labor and excessive tasks, equalize wages while differentiating functions which have become more mobile. And this is an area in which action can be quick, notably in the public sector.

And let us not forget the key to all of this: a substantial reduction in the hours of work. This reduction to at least 35 hours per week is not only designed to lessen fatigue, accidents and nuisances. It is tied to a self-management practice by giving the workers greater flexibility vis-a-vis their jobs, by making private and social life more active, more perceptive, by reducing exploitation.

We might even say that today a 7-hour workday, 5 days a week, is the main objective of wage earners. The ownership sector and the state have turned this down and will turn it down with determination; however, we see quite well today that this demand among us wage earners is assuming a consistency hitherto lacking.

Everything I have just recalled has for a long time now been a part of the social policy advocated by the PSU. However, with the deepening of the crisis and the policy pursued by R. Barre, with the election setback of the political left in 1978 and the breaking off among its parties, the self-management perspective had seemed to dim. The PSU found itself the advocate of a future which appeared to be without promise. But now we can say that its patience is beginning to bear fruit. Everyone is beginning to understand that all of the most legitimate party demands are without greater significance unless they fall within the framework of a self-management perspective. What is more, today we better understand that this is not solely a "national" question but is also a European question.

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## NEW BOOK FOCUSES ON COMMUNIST STRATEGY OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 20 Sep 79 p 2

[Review by Henri Martin of the book "Pour une strategie autogestionnaire" ["In Favor of a Self-Management Strategy"] by Felix Damette and Jacques Scheibling, Editions sociales]

[Text] The book by Felix Damette and Jacques Scheibling, "Pour une strategie autogestionnaire," is at the heart of the problems raised by the 23rd Congress and the last session of the Central Committee.

By linking our self-management strategy to a similar movement of the immediate struggles and political prospects, this work--in the form of an interview with Gilbert Kasserman--is an original contribution to deepening our policy and putting it into immediate practice.

The Party's whole political thinking has always been based upon the idea that everything depended on the masses themselves.

At the time the Common Program was signed Georges Marchais, in the Central Committee in June 1972, emphasized on several occasions, "It is mass movement, it is the aptitude of our Party for organizing and amplifying it that are decisive."

The step we were led to follow contained in itself a necessary return to the notion of self-management. This idea, then, did not come out of nothing, was not merely an additional formula in our vocabulary.

Felix Damette and Jacques Scheibling show how the 22nd and 23rd Congresses boldly resolved those questions and established a close tie between immediate struggles and political change.

The authors explain that the future cannot be the result of abstractly copying model experiments existing elsewhere, or a preestablished model.

They point out the fact that our self-management strategy is at once the extension of all our thinking on the road to socialism and of our democratic practice, but also that it is something profoundly new and innovative that involves overturning our conception of the revolution and its conditions.

The liaison between immediate struggles and political changes materializes in the battle objectives that are not taken up in a programmatic process, but as objectives which can be made to succeed only by the awareness and the extent of the workers' action--a success indispensable, in its turn, to the advance of consciousness, to changing the power struggle.

It is therefore clear that this strategy does not involve building islands of socialism under Giscard, but putting an end to the government's policy and at the same time winning points of support and awareness of the developing struggles encompassing all social strata. This is the battle process that will result in a new power struggle making it possible to hurdle a series of thresholds leading to the break with capitalism.

By explaining the concept of perspectives in reply to the question "What kind of socialism do we want? And by what means do we want to get there?", they help us understand that the distinction between the objective the means of achieving it is erroneous, that "in fact socialism will not conform to a pre-set goal, it will be in fact the product of its building," that "the Communists' plan comes out of struggle and is built in struggle."

By returning to the crisis, by showing that what is at the heart of society's crisis is the crisis of exploitation, that it is fundamentally expressed in the economic and social content [?context] of work, by linking the family-school-work-recreation entity with the social relations it implies, they bring to light the role of struggle in "re-forming the society, the mechanisms and the relations on a different foundation, with the direct participation of the interested parties, starting with the interested parties themselves."

After reading this book I also think it would not be reasonable for a militant to claim to analyze completely the problems of life in business, in big cities and large groups without this work, which assembles the Party's thinking on this subject and offers opinions designed to expand this thinking.

The authors' work, which first got its feet wet in courses in the central schools, will help militants to take better account of the crisis in all its dimensions and likewise to give the immediate struggles their proper place in our political work, especially in relation to union at the base.

By explaining that union at the base "means that the struggles are decided upon directly, taken charge of and developed by the workers themselves," that it is not a matter of lowering the level of the struggles, but rather of raising it by rooting it ever more firmly in reality as it is lived by the workers in their diversity, they show that this necessitates both "favoring the initiative, taking struggle into account on the part of every workers' collective in business firms, up to the level of the workshop, the team, to the highest level, in such a way that every collective is concerned and associated," they show that this necessitates being devoted to dealing with government policy and big capital, to providing political clarity.

They contribute to understanding the union's current problems by stressing the fact that the political expression of the social movement is to express an effective and adequate advance of this movement itself and an evolution of the political power struggle marked by a notable strengthening of the Party of the

working class, because the democratic battle is a class battle and the alliance must be made around the class that has the decisive role.

By thus clarifying the articulation and content of a whole series of the key words of the 23rd Congress, F. Pamette and J. Scheibling demonstrate that our self-management step involves neither abandoning principle nor taking over for electoral purposes, but making our practice conform to our ideal, to the revolutionary step suitable for France in our time.

They demonstrate that we really have an offensive strategy that ideally will now begin to open up each individual to winning all human rights as a citizen and worker in the struggle.

They come to the correct conclusions concerning the characteristics of the Party that are necessary for this step. That is to say, both the number, and a high political level, making it possible for every Party organization, every Communist to be the initiator of the struggles.

The Party is a living body and its step is also alive.

Our self-management strategy involves ignoring what the Congress said has been completed. On the contrary, the very principle of the self-management strategy is its constant enrichment of life.

The authors intend this book to be just a moment of reflection to aid in developing Communists' thinking on this question. But this moment of reflection is very timely and will certainly be judged as such by the readers.

894  
CSO: 3100

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

PCF, PCE DELEGATIONS CONFER--A PCE delegation visited France from 3 through 5 October 1979. The delegation, which comprised Comrades Carlos Alonso, PCE Executive Committee and Secretariat member, and Jordi Borja, a member of the Executive Committee of the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia, met with a PCF delegation comprising Politburo member Madeleine Vincent and Central Committee members Marcel Rosette and Marcel Trigon. The talks enabled a rich exchange of views to take place on the two parties' respective activities in the field of local organizations. These talks took place in the atmosphere of fraternity which has long characterized PCF-PCE relations. This meeting forms part of the two parties' desire to increase their cooperation. In this spirit it was decided to hold regular meetings to exchange experiences on the problems of the social and democratic management of communes. The PCE delegation was also received by Georges Valbon, Central Committee member and chairman of the Seine-Saint-Denis Department council, and met with elected representatives of the cities of Stains and Amiens. [Text] [LD171351 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 6 Oct 79 p 7 LD]

CSO: 3100

## PERTINI DISCUSSES NATIONAL, WORLD ISSUES AT SARAJEVO

## Sarajevo Issues

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 14 Oct 79 pp 1, 4 LD

[Report by Arminio Savioli on President Pertini 13 October press conference in Sarajevo: "Pertini Says: I Am in Favor of Unity Policy"]

[Excerpts] Sarajevo--What should have been a press conference on the Italian president's state visit to Yugoslavia was transformed yesterday morning into a broad, long and cordial conversation during which Pertini, stimulated by the journalists' questions, was able to range over several topics concerning not only foreign but also domestic policy. In particular, Pertini took a cue from a question on Yugoslav socialism ("work in partnership, self-management, freedom and men as the masters, not the slaves, of machines") to express a verdict on what the government formula should be in Italy. After praising the Yugoslav experiment, Pertini invoked cooperation in Italy, especially in Emilia. He recalled his visit two Sundays ago to the Granarolo cooperative, adding: "It was managed not only by communists and socialists, but also by Christian Democrats. In fact its managers told me that if one of the three parties withdrew its support the cooperative would collapse." Then, following an obvious association of ideas, Pertini said: "The much maligned and much lamented national unity...I tell you, dear colleague, (this is how Pertini addresses journalists, having himself been editor of AVANTII and IL LAVORO) that I am in favor of national unity, and I say this without mincing my words, though this might confuse my aides somewhat."

Pertini was also asked a question about the rumored installation of new missiles in Italy and other NATO countries, with the aim (according to certain Atlantic political and military forces) of "reestablishing" a balance which has allegedly been "violated" by supposed Soviet superiority. The question was designed to discover whether the issue was discussed by the Italian and Yugoslav presidents and whether (as is being rumored) the latter declared himself in favor of the initiative. Pertini replied that the question was "dangerous" and that in any case the issue is still sub-judice. He added: "Yes, Schmidt and Strauss, among others, talked to me about this during my recent visit to Germany. The issue concerns

medium-range missiles.... But perhaps, who knows, they might later have an even longer range.... I see that my friend General Bernardini (the president's military adviser--L'UNITA editor's note) is signaling to me.... I cannot now give you a precise answer to this because the issue has not yet been discussed by our government and has not yet been brought before parliament. Because I believe that it must be brought before parliament..."

Pertini was also asked "what motivated" his visit to Sarajevo, the city where Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated on 18 June 1914, sparking off World War I. "You know," Pertini said, "that I am among those who fought in World War I, even though we did not want it, because they sent me to the trenches, while many people who did want the war spent it in offices and behind the lines.... But let that pass. War is a monster which must be expunged from mankind. I hope that the SALT II treaty will be ratified by the U.S. Senate, despite the Cuban case. But I am still worried about mankind's future. The two superpowers already have enough to destroy the world."

The Italian president placed great emphasis on Tito's and his own concerns at the dangers threatening detente. Tito is opposed to anything that could alter the precarious balance on which peace rests and therefore, in particular, to this or that country joining either alliance (Pertini prefers this word to the cruder term "bloc"). In other words, it is a good thing that the nonaligned countries should increase rather than decrease in number and that no new members should join NATO or the Warsaw Pact.

In answer to a question concerning the possible "dangers" that would threaten Yugoslavia "from the East," on the international plane, and on the part of "conformist," that is pro-Soviet, "elements," on the domestic plane, Pertini simply stressed that "Tito and his government intend to maintain their stance on nonalignment at all costs." Tito's speech in Havana proves that there is "no weakness, but indeed a firm determination" within the Yugoslav leadership group on this point. With regard to relations with the other Balkan countries (the disagreement with Bulgaria over the Macedonian issue is well known), Tito, Pertini said, wants them to be good relations of good-neighbourliness and cooperation. "I can say no more," he added.

In answer to questions concerning Southeast Asia and the Middle East, Pertini said that both he and Tito do not regard either the former or still less the latter as "stabilized." They are, on the contrary, dangerous hotbeds of tension and war which could jeopardize peace throughout the world. Particularly in the Middle East, no lasting solution is possible (and on this point, Pertini said, "we and Tito are of the same opinion") without giving "a territory and a homeland" to the Palestinians, who "now find themselves in the same situation as the Jewish people before the creation of Israel." Pertini went on to specify that he was "expressing a personal opinion, without involving other people's responsibilities," probably referring to the fact that the Italian Government (and, for that matter, the other EC governments) are in fact talking in terms of satisfying the Palestinians' legitimate rights but without committing themselves

with respect to the territorial issue. It is true, nevertheless, that one could add that the formula of a "territory and a homeland" is not the same as a "state." As is known, Yugoslavia is in favor of the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza. Agreement between the two presidents, therefore, might not be complete and perfect. But perhaps it is only a question of details.

#### Sarajevo Remarks Defended

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 15 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD

Report by Arminio Savioli: "Pertini and Tito: Exemplary Relations Between the Countries"]

[Excerpt] Rome--President Pertini has returned to Rome at the end of his state visit to Yugoslavia. A joint communique has been released by the two governments. There is also another unofficial document. It concerns not relations between Rome and Belgrade but a purely domestic issue, namely national unity in Italy, raised by Pertini himself on Saturday during his press conference in Sarajevo. The document in question is a shorthand statement made to Italian radio and television and ANSA yesterday morning.

"I am surprised," Pertini said, "that so much noise has been made about a remark I made at the Sarajevo press conference, where I discussed 'national unity.' I did not refer to any possible government formation, either present or future. It is not up to me, but parliament, to decide on this. A president of the republic, a head of state, must always try to insure that national unity is created around him. It would be surprising if I envisaged national disunity. I must envisage national unity and this national unity must be achieved so that all the problems facing the country can be tackled. But far be it from me to envisage any particular government or coalition.... I believe I have been very clear. Therefore I am surprised that, from what I have read in the agency reports which arrived on my desk this morning, some politicians were alarmed because I mentioned the words 'national unity.' They should be surprised if I spoke about disunity. The head of state must represent national unity and not this or that political group, this or that party.... I would cease to be head of state, I would cease to be what the Constitution requires, if I did not represent all Italians. Therefore let the politicians who were alarmed consider what I have told you this morning: I am in favor of national unity. As head of state, I must represent all Italians and if I must represent all Italians, clearly I must be in favor of unity."

Pertini's explanation was further illustrated by his spokesman Ghirelli during a briefing at the Croazia Hotel.

"The president," Ghirelli said, "was not referring, when he spoke about national unity, either to a government formula or to a policy, but to the unity of all Italians, for whom, according to constitutional requirements, he is both symbol and guarantor."

## PRAGUE DISSIDENT TRIAL A 'GRAVE ERROR,' 'SPLITIST ELEMENT'

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 23 Oct 79 p 1 LD

[Unattributed commentary: "Prague Trial"]

[Text] Tomorrow in Prague sees the tragedy of the start of another trial of six persons, members of Charter 77, hauled before the court for crimes of opinion.

Whoever believes in the possibility of changing the world, whoever has faith in the attainment of a different kind of future is dutybound to raise his voice in defense of the rights of the six accused (Uhl, Benda, Dienstibl, Havel, Bednarova and Nemcova) which were already trampled at the time of their arrest in May; he cannot close his eyes at the virulence with which the Czechoslovak press is branding them, describing them as a "fifth column" for foreign interests and thus providing a foretaste of the scenario for the trial. It should be added that this trial will be taking place practically *in camera*, access will be refused to the press and all information will be skillfully rationed, to prevent the real course of proceedings and their real nature from becoming known.

We would like to state extremely clearly that our protest is not a concession to anyone--especially not to the enemies of socialism. It is socialism which is outraged by this trial. There are no valid "objective" or historical justifications for it. We are living in 1979 and are dealing with today's problems, including the problem of mobilizing vast masses of people in connection with the ideals of peace and progress. This affair in Prague influences and weighs more heavily in people's minds than the Czechoslovak party and state leaders who chose the path of repression imagine. Do they recognize the signals stemming from their choice? From the picture of an entrenchment in a power logic with the appearance of the extreme manifestation of an unresolved problem: the relationship between the transition to socialism and democratic consensus? Anyone needing confirmation of the historical and political need for Eurocommunism will find it here also.

We live in the heart of a continent in which the danger of an arms race and a serious erosion of peaceful coexistence between differing realities has reemerged. At a time like this an administration of public life in the Eastern Bloc marked by stockades, barriers and the repression of ideas is a great obstacle. Therefore for people who, like us, regard peace and international coexistence as a real movement of the masses and of people's awareness, even more than as an agreement between armies, the Prague trial is a grave error, a splitist element--perhaps not among the states, but certainly for the political, social and ideological forces which want to change the world.

CSO: 3104

## AGREEMENT WITH IMF REPORTEDLY IN ABEYANCE

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Sep 79 p 17

[Text] The contacts begun with the IMF last week are continuing in Lisbon and should last for a few more days. It is not likely that a definitive agreement with the IMF will result from these talks. A new letter of intent and a new plan of the stand-by type to be agreed on with the IMF will probably not be reached until sometime near the end of the year.

The state's accounts and the deficit in the public sector have been the dominant issues in the negotiations that have now resumed. As is usual in this type of contact, the IMF delegation has been trying to gather precise information from Portuguese authorities concerning the current situation in the country's economy. It has been making use of data provided by the Bank of Portugal's Department of Statistics and Planning and the Central Planning Department.

The Central Bank's credit and rediscount policies and developments in our accounts with the outside world have also been decisive issues in this phase of the talks. The clearly positive behavior of the current external deficit, which was cut in half in 1978, will certainly make it possible to strengthen the trend toward a gradual reduction in the pace at which the escudo is being devalued, a trend that has already been obvious this year.

Portuguese financial authorities--represented in these talks by the Bank of Portugal--still assign special significance to a possible drop in the Central Bank's rediscount rate, a move that would automatically be reflected in a reduction in the interest rates charged by commercial banks.

Improved interest rates might be of direct benefit to investment, the drop in which--especially in the processing industry--constitutes the most negative offset to the favorable results achieved in implementing the Portuguese economy's "stabilization program," to which reference has already been made. One factor whose effect is particularly seasonal may make it inadvisable, however, to reduce interest rates: we are speaking here of remittances by emigrants, for whom the high return on their deposits has been an especially attractive factor.

Another significant issue in the negotiations now underway has been the question of credit ceilings. At the moment some degree of credit expansion seems indispensable. On the other hand, the budget deficit and the difficulties in the public sector, made worse by a policy that for many months has made it impossible to adjust the price of goods and services produced by that sector, will certainly be a factor exerting pressure on the banking sector's domestic credit. On the other hand, the substantial reduction in the amounts of credit normally granted by the banks seems to be creating--according to recent trend indications--a totally new situation made evident by the difficulties being experienced by a number of banking institutions, which are encountering problems in making their overall activity profitable and achieving favorable operating results.

According to all indications, the question of credit expansion will probably continue to be a focus of attention for the Portuguese representatives and the IMF delegation over the next few days. This is because it has to do with the difficult situation foreseen for the state's accounts and also involves directly the question of the money supply and the economy's overall liquidity itself.

One thing is seen as certain, however: the contacts with the IMF are going to continue, but for now there will probably not be a definitive agreement. In other words, the negotiations now underway will not result in a new "letter of intention." As a matter of fact, the international financial markets are quite liberal at the moment, and the obtaining of loans does not seem to be in jeopardy or difficult. On the other hand, despite the current government's expressed intention to enter into a new agreement with the IMF, the preparatory work on next year's general state budget is still in a quite incipient stage, and this means that the indispensable conditions for signing a new formal agreement with the IMF do not yet exist.

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## JANUARY-MAY TRADE DEFICIT REACHES 60 MILLION CONTOS

Lisbon JORNAL NOVO in Portuguese 19 Sep 79 p 14

[Text] Portugal's trade deficit for the period from January through May of this year reached 55.9 billion escudos, according to the INE (National Statistics Institute).

Imports totaled 119.4 billion escudos--up 29 percent from the same period last year--while exports amounted to 63.5 billion escudos for an increase of 63 percent.

The rate at which exports covered imports increased from 42.2 percent to 53.2 percent.

The chief contributors to the deficit were crude oil (16.3 billion escudos) and wheat and corn (8.9 billion escudos). Together they accounted for 21 percent of the total imports.

The negative balance with the OECD countries as a whole totaled 38.3 billion escudos (90.1 billion in imports and 51.8 billion in exports), important elements in that figure being 15.2 billion with the Common Market, 1.6 billion with EFTA, 11.7 billion with the United States, and 4.9 billion with Spain.

The INE notes that "although the deficit has worsened by about 2.6 billion escudos in relation to the same period the year before, the rate of cover developed favorably, rising from 46.8 percent in 1978 to 57.5 percent in 1979."

## United States and Great Britain the Leaders

Portugal purchased 51.4 billion escudos worth of products from the EEC (43 percent of its total imports) and sold 36.2 billion escudos worth to the EEC (56.9 percent of its exports).

The largest deficit within that economic bloc was with the FRG (5.3 billion escudos--the result of 15.4 billion in imports and 8.1 billion in exports).

That country is Portugal's chief supplier within the EEC and its second largest supplier in the world as a whole, with first place being occupied by the United States (15.7 billion escudos).

Portugal's biggest customer continues to be Great Britain at 11.5 billion escudos or 18.1 percent of the total imports. It is in third place as a supplier, with 9.4 percent (11.2 billion) of Portugal's exports [paragraph as published].

Portugal has favorable balances within the EEC with Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.

The INE points out that "also noted was Portugal's favorable development in its trade relations with EFTA," since the negative balance of 1.6 billion escudos is 7.9 billion escudos below the figure for the same period last year.

The rate of cover rose from 63.2 percent to 83.2 percent, and the highest deficit within that bloc (with Switzerland) rose from 2.2 billion to 2.5 billion escudos.

#### Textiles Lead

For all the European countries having planned economies, the INE found a negative balance of 813 million escudos--1.6 billion escudos less than for the same period in 1978.

With the countries in the former escudo zone, a positive balance of 1.7 billion escudos was noted (2.7 billion in exports and 1 billion in imports).

Vegetable products (22.6 billion escudos), machinery, appliances, and electrical equipment (20.4 billion), and vegetable products [repetition as published] (14.9 billion) were the main import items, showing increases of 26.9 percent and 38.3 percent in comparison with the same period in 1978.

In the export sector, the main items were textiles (19.5 billion escudos), transportation equipment and machinery (8.1 billion), and food products (6.9 billion), representing respectively increases of 73.5 percent, 48.3 percent, and 56.4 percent in comparison with the same period last year.

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ENC: 3101

## TEXTILE EXPORT FIGURES REPORTED

Lisbon JORNAL NOVO in Portuguese 21 Sep 79 p 1 Supplement

[Text] The textile industry, which employs more than 150,000 workers distributed among more than 2,000 firms, provides 30 percent of the volume of Portuguese exports and one-quarter of the total added value produced by the processing industry.

The chief recipients of our exports are the EEC, which absorbs 61.8 percent of our sales abroad, and EFTA, which absorbs 22.0 percent. This sector--traditionally an export industry--is encountering a number of difficulties owing to the excessive concentration of sales in the European market. Even though most of the firms have no problems as far as their order books for next year are concerned, a diversification of traditional markets is urgent (for example, by recapturing the markets in Angola and Mozambique).

The imposition of quotas and the EEC's import allotments, the increasing difficulty in obtaining export licenses, the import duties in some countries (the United States and Canada, for example), and the instability of raw material prices are some of the difficulties, among others, being encountered by export firms in the textile industry.

On the other hand, even though Portugal's textile industry is competitive on the European market, it may soon be experiencing competition from countries with cheaper manpower.

Difficulties on the national level are also being experienced by some firms in this sector due to delays in obtaining raw materials, the high rate of interest, current labor legislation, and overdue payments.

The good reputation enjoyed by our textile items on the international markets is due almost entirely to the improving quality of Portuguese export products and the dynamism of private businessmen in that industry.

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## GALICIAN STATUTE PLAGUED BY PARTISAN DISAGREEMENTS

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 22 Sep 79 p 8

[Text] Madrid, 21 September (LA VANGUARDIA)—The PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] and the nationalists will try to expand the limits of Galician home rule, we can gather from the points of disagreement presented in connection with the Galician draft statute. The deadline was this evening, which the UCD [Democratic Center Union] did not meet; it will submit its points by mail. The Catalans and Basques have proposed their respective statutes as points of reference for the upcoming discussion in the joint committee. The following number of points of disagreement have been set forth: PSOE, 150; PCE, 28; CD [Democratic Convergence, 5. The PSA [Socialist Party of Andalusia] and the Joint Group have not submitted any.

This evening was the deadline for submitting points of disagreement in connection with the draft statute for Galicia. Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, the minister of the presidency, this morning put the final touches on the points of disagreement submitted by the UCD, which involve general views and do not get down to specifics. We should remember that the draft was almost entirely drawn up by UCD legislators, given their preponderance in the Galician home rule organization. For its part, the PSOE submitted more than 150 points of disagreement in a bid to expand the constitutional limits. The PCE submitted just 28, which, however, entail in-depth modification of the draft. The Catalan Socialists and the Basques backed the PSOE amendments.

In addition, the parliamentary group of the Catalan Minority submitted the texts of the Basque and Catalan autonomy statutes as points of reference for debate on the Galician statute, while reserving the right to take part in debate on each and every one of the draft's articles by citing already approved drafts as points of reference. Lastly, the Andalusian group and Blas Pinar did not submit points of disagreement.

## PSOE Press Conference

The points of disagreement submitted by the PSOE parliamentary group revolve around extending constitutional limits and backing the chance for separate Galician development and territorial solidarity. During a press conference this evening the chairman of the PSOE's Negotiating Commission, accompanied by Galician Socialist deputies Jose Luis Rodriguez Pardo and Pablo Pardo Yanez, explained their group's main points of disagreement, which number about 150. Before moving on to this area, they pointed out that the most important development in the evolution of Galician nationalism over the last few decades is the intimate relationship between the defense of class interests and the defense of the cultural and historical personality of the Galician nationality. "The true liberation of the working classes and the poor does not run counter to but is linked to the liberation of Galicia as a culturally oppressed and economically exploited people."

The PSOE parliamentary group pointed out that its points of disagreement are intended to expand wherever possible the jurisdictions of the autonomous Galician community and to provide it with sufficient resources for its development. In this connection they indicated that the attainment of a more advanced statute for Galicia would be facilitated by the fact that the Catalan and Basque statutes gained more jurisdictions than were originally expected and that the PSOE's correlation of forces at the national level is more favorable than in the assembly of Galician legislators.

### Three Headings

They then grouped their points of disagreement under three main headings. The first category includes the points dealing with cultural grievances, that is to say, the right and duty to keep the Galician language alive and the broadening of jurisdiction in the area of education.

Under the second heading come the legal recognition and consolidation of natural sociological entities such as the parish and the district, as well as the absorption by the Galician government of the artificial entities created by centralism, such as provincial delegations and demarcations.

Lastly comes the organization of Galicia's finances in such a way that Galician savings will be invested locally and that it will enjoy a more just distribution of the national budget.

With regard to emigration, in its amendment to Article 4 of the draft the PSOE backs a jobs policy that will eliminate the need to emigrate.

Finally, as regards the controversial question of a Galician capital city, the PSOE feels that the first Galician Parliament ought to decide this matter, suggesting, however, that a two-thirds, not a three-fourths majority be required for a decision.

In addition, it proposes a strictly proportional and much fairer apportionment of deputies per province. Lastly, the Galician Socialists call for the reinstatement of figures such as the people's defender and ask that the number of votes needed for representation in the Galician Parliament be cut from 3 to 1.5 percent of the census.

For its part, the Communist parliamentary group submitted 28 points of disagreement with the draft Galician statute this evening. Enrique Curiel pointed out that the Galician home rule statute needs in-depth improvements, such as greater jurisdiction for the autonomous community, bearing in mind, moreover, the Catalan and Basque precedents, "which does not mean, however, that it has to be a copy of them." Mr Curiel indicated that in specific aspects such as the economy, fishing, farming and livestock, it could be enhanced even further than the Basque and Catalan statutes. He also stated that it is going to be the first statute in which the UCD will have a majority and that therefore the party should reconsider its stand of recent months in order to achieve a statute that is totally acceptable to all Galician political forces and that can be a major tool for Galicia's economic, social, cultural and political recovery.

With regard to improving the statute, Mr Curiel stated that this would mean ending the anti-Basque and anti-Catalan campaign and would demonstrate that the system of home rule is not a system of privileges.

Among the 28 points of disagreement presented by the PCE, we should point out the ones calling for a new wording of the section dealing with Galician as an official language (without affecting its status as a co-official language along with Spanish) and its use in government acts, relations with citizens and by the home rule administration. In connection with the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the Galician Parliament, the PCE feels that the law has quite a few technical gaps that give it somewhat of a presidentially-oriented flavor, and it therefore suggests improvements of the text in some of its points of disagreement.

#### The Province as Electoral District

The PCE also proposes the province as an electoral district. With regard to the law that will govern the dissolution of the Galician Parliament, the Communists include in it the motion of censure and the vote of confidence. They also call for the reinstatement of the

people's defender. According to the points of disagreement, the president of the Junta should also be able to delegate executive functions to a top adviser, who would be similar to a prime minister of a home rule government.

As regards the third section, the Communists want to spell out and guarantee jurisdiction in the areas of education, health care and social security, Spanish Radio and Television, planning of the economy, livestock, farming and fishing, savings and control over Galician savings institutions and an autonomous police force.

Section 3 is completely changed in the points of disagreements submitted by the PCE; it deals with the administration of justice, and the Communists assign greater jurisdiction to the Superior Court of Justice. As regards Section 4, which involves finances, the PCE pursues a line similar to the Catalan statute, though cutting the time periods, 4 years. Lastly, like the PSOE, it rejects the UCD proposal of three percent of the census in favor of greater proportionality.

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CSO: 3010

## FINANCE MINISTER GIVES OPTIMISTIC 1980 GROWTH FIGURES

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 3 Oct 79 p 41

Text 7 Belgrade—Over the next year the Spanish economy will grow at a "rate slightly higher than the average anticipated for the industrialized countries" despite the "adverse international context and even though the government intends to avoid any artificial stimulus and to limit the growth of current public expenditures." These statements were made yesterday by Spanish Finance Minister Jaime Garcia Anoveros at the 34th annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

In a notably optimistic speech on the Spanish economy, which at times contrasted with the pessimistic and even catastrophic picture that IMF directors and delegates painted at the Belgrade meeting on the world economy, Garcia Anoveros also pointed out that attaining these objectives "will entail major national efforts and sacrifices."

#### Unemployment, the Number One Problem

Garcia Anoveros's address primarily reflected the commitment made to the Parliament under the government's economic program to reform the Spanish economy and put it on a sound footing, with major emphasis "on dealing with the pressures of unemployment, which is our most serious problem at the moment."

The mere wording of this sentence, which identifies unemployment as the Spanish economy's most serious problem, again contrasts with the outlook and philosophy of the Belgrade meeting, which overwhelmingly pointed to inflation as the most serious problem of the industrialized countries.

In referring to inflation, the Spanish minister pointed out that in the area of prices Spain has achieved "important results." He went on to say that "the rate of inflation, which had risen to 26 percent throughout 1977, fell to 16.5 percent in 1978 and will be down again this year, despite the new inflationary pressures affecting the world

economy." Garcia Anoveros interpreted these figures as a sign that Spain is gradually approaching the inflation rates of the OECD countries, where price increases no greater than 10-12 percent are expected.

#### Foreign Sector Improvement

One of the most optimistic facets of Spain's economic situation, according to the minister's speech, is the foreign sector. Garcia Anoveros was pleased about the favorable opinion regarding Spain's foreign sector that was expressed in the IMF's annual report, and he disclosed that after a \$1.5 billion surplus in 1978, the Spanish Government still expects a modest surplus this year in the current account, which will presumably record a deficit next year.

"I must stress," the minister pointed out, "that Spain has managed to put its foreign accounts on a sound footing without resorting to competitive devaluations or to increased trade protectionism." He made no mention, however, of the fact that Spanish companies have negotiated 38 joint loans in the international capital market over the first 7 months of the year, which, in turn, also reflects the confidence that many investors have in Spain's situation.

With regard to specific IMF issues, Garcia Anoveros said that he backed the creation of the substitution account, which would be voluntary and offer attractive conditions of profitability, liquidity and transferability. Nevertheless, the Spanish minister pointed out the drawback that this account might adversely affect international capital markets.

Lastly, the Spanish minister hailed the IMF's decision to boost its capital by \$40 billion; called for greater World Bank support for energy and health care projects; regarded as appropriate the recommendations of the development committee to substantially boost the program's loans, and in connection with the IMF, called for a quick decision on the general collection and distribution of the sixth funds repayment.

In the sphere of bilateral efforts with the IMF and World Bank, the Spanish minister announced the government's decision to increase to \$40 million its contribution to the financing of the International Financial Association (it has not topped \$37 million so far).

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CSO: 3110

## INFLATION FIGURES FOR AUGUST GIVEN

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 27 Sep 79 p 43

Excerpts The cost of living index, as measured by consumer prices, recorded a rise of one percent in August, the National Statistics Institute confirmed yesterday.

In providing definite confirmation of this one percent increase, Statistics Institute sources denied rumors that were circulating yesterday morning to the effect that the index was being revised upwards to as much as two percent.

The one percent rise in the consumer price index represents a drop in the monthly inflation rate since the beginning of the year. The cumulative index now stands at 10.7 percent, whereas the annual inflation rate over the last 12 months stood at 14.7 percent in August.

The consumer price index last August jumped 1.7 percent, and it is significant that this is higher than the rise for August of this year, keeping in mind that the oil price hike of last 2 July still had an indirect impact on the index in August 1979.

Foor prices were up 1.3 percent; clothing, up 1.1 percent, and housing rose 0.6 percent.

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CSO: 3110

## GOVERNMENT PLANS AGRARIAN REFORM ACTIONS

Madrid ABC in Spanish 27 Sep 79 p 37

[Text] Seville, 26 September—It has come out in Seville farming circles that at a meeting last Monday evening with Agriculture Minister Jaime Lamo de Espinosa, large Andalusian landowners were given serious warnings that a great many lands would be quickly expropriated for use in the event that the situation continues as it has, according to EUROPA PRESS.

According to these circles, the landowners asked to meet with Mr Lamo de Espinosa because they were disturbed by news that quick expropriations were being readied for when the Senate passes the bill on "manifestly improvable properties."

As we know, the president of the Institute of Agrarian Reform and Development (IRYDA), Mr Gil Alberdi, has written to agriculture delegates in Andalusia and Extremadura, asking them to extend their consultations to city halls in order to determine how many farms with more than 50 hectares of irrigated land and 200 hectares of dry land are being poorly utilized.

Concern—Although accounts of the meeting with the minister are not very complete, it seems that the landowners showed particular interest in information regarding the scope of the aforementioned bill and the government's determination to implement it. They also took the opportunity to bring up their problems and to explain what a thorough improvement or a change in crops would entail, especially because the crops that they do not want to plant do not command profitable prices, in their view.

According to the sources consulted by EUROPA PRESS, Mr Lamo de Espinosa indicated that there would be no property expropriations, because agrarian reform has always been a failure in Spain owing to the lack of money, but that the government is determined to carry expropriations of use as far as necessary.

In this connection, the minister noted that the unemployment level is cause for concern and that if solidarity is not reflected in specific

projects and programs to enhance the utilization of farms towards more labor-intensive crops, there would be many expropriations of use and methods would be developed so that they could be quickly undertaken once the law on manifestly improvable farms is passed.

Large Andalusian farms have recently stepped up the growing of grain crops, which are hardly labor-intensive, and have cut down on cotton, beets and even olives, which the government is trying to encourage in order to absorb some of the 80,000 persons without jobs in the region. These last-mentioned crops are estimated to be five times more labor-intensive than grains, which are more profitable on large farms because of the ease of mechanization.

Catalog—In the IRYDA president's letter to Andalusian delegates, which was printed by EUROPA PRESS last Friday, Mr Gil Alberdi suggests that in determining the number of farms with more than 500 hectares of dry land or 50 hectares of irrigated land and in giving a provisional rating to these farms on the local level, they ought to collaborate with city halls, aside from following instructions that they received previously on consultations with farming chambers. This is an attempt to lend a full-fledged social meaning to private property.

Ratings will be assigned by farm and, if possible, adjusted to the following scale of values: 1) Properly utilized in accordance with its potential; 2) Properly utilized in part, with clearly idle potential; 3) Poorly utilized; 4) Major abandoned areas, along with replaceable crops; 5) Extensive grain growing on land suitable for beets, cotton or corn.

In addition to these ratings, they will cite the reasons for the situation. Moreover, as a first practical application, the delegates were told that they can at any time propose the social interest expropriation of farms that they regard as the most important in the province, either because they come under the above points 3, 4 or 5 and constitute serious trouble spots or because they are abandoned or insufficiently utilized.

8743  
CSO: 3110

## INCREASE IN EXPORTS TO BRAZIL FORESEEN

Madrid ABC in Spanish 23 Sep 79 p 40

[Text] Juan Antonio Garcia Diez, the minister of commerce and tourism, returned yesterday to Madrid from Rio de Janeiro after a 2-day official visit.

Upon arriving at Barajas, Mr Garcia Diez said that he had reached two agreements with Brazilian authorities, one to broaden IRYDA's [Institute of Agrarian Reform and Development] cooperative efforts in Brazil, and another to renew the 1964 cultural pact, which had become obsolete.

In the economic sphere, the minister pointed out that Spain has a sizable deficit in its balance of payments with Brazil, since it exports \$100 million dollars worth of goods and imports \$500 million. He emphasized that he stressed the need to take some corrective measures.

He also said that export transactions totaling some \$300 million have been closed for items such as locomotives, iron and steel goods and ships. He added that talks have begun on the potential export of a hydroelectric powerplant, oil drilling platforms and a number of additional ships.

Lastly, the minister stated that the Brazilian authorities have agreed to establish a 12,000 ton quota for Spanish garlic exports and a 4,000 ton quota for grapes and pears from Spain.

8743  
CSO: 3110

## GASOLINE CONSUMPTION REPORTEDLY DECREASES TO 1978 LEVELS

Madrid ABC in Spanish 3 Oct 79 p 34

[Text] Gasoline consumption in Spain has stabilized over the last 2 weeks at levels similar to those of the same period last year, despite the normal increase in the number of vehicles. The increase from 1 January to 17 September totals 5.7 percent, which means a significant fall in the growth rate compared to the first 6 months of the year (10.2 percent).

The consumption of the various types of gas oil has increased slightly over the last 2 weeks (4.9 percent over 1978 levels), but consumption over the last 3 months, as compared to last year, has dropped the cumulative index of 10.7 percent over the first half to 8 percent as of 17 September.

With regard to fuel oil, consumption has increased with respect to the first 6 months of the year, but overall consumption is still below that of the same period last year.

With regard to electric power output by sectors, there has been an appreciable rise in hydroelectric output over the last 2 weeks (12.2 percent), along with somewhat of a rebound in nuclear power output, which had been proceeding at a pace slower than that of last year.

Nationwide Production—On the other hand, total domestic crude oil production for last August rose to 119,533 tons, the highest monthly figure for the last 20 months.

Last August's output, the publication PETROLEO notes, represents an increase of 41.9 percent over July, when production hit 84,226 tons, the highest total for the first 7 months of the year. Output for August of last year totaled 101,359 tons, and cumulative domestic production for the first 8 months of this year is up to 594,935 tons, which is 11.9 percent below the total for the same period last year, 675,166 tons.

Meanwhile, speculation continues on the possibility of a new crude oil price hike. According to the Kuwaiti newspaper AS-SIYASSAH, a number of exporting countries, including several Persian Gulf states, will soon boost their prices by \$2 a barrel. It adds that the current market situation requires an increase to the level that the market can tolerate, especially after the cutback in Iranian output.

Even though the Emirate of Dubai has denied that it is going to boost crude oil prices and the United Arab Emirates has expressed its intention to oppose the request for a hike by a number of OPEC members, fears of a possible revision persist.

For the time being, Iran and Indonesia have decided to increase the prices of the petroleum that they sell to Japan, and similar boosts are expected on sales to other countries. OPEC members will be taking a look at these hikes at their December meeting in Caracas.

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## BRIEFS

INDUSTRY SLOWS DOWN—Industrial activity slumped again in July, according to the businessmen surveyed by the Ministry of Industry. This is not surprising, in that it is merely a continuation of the slowdown noted in the sector for some months now. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy because of how widespread it has become, and in a number of subsectors because of its depth. The general industrial slowdown, except in construction, shows up in all of the indicators for this sphere. The backlog of orders has fallen eight points from its spot the previous month. It is thus at its lowest level in the last 14 months, minus 47, which represents a falloff to the levels prior to the outset of the slow, and incomplete, process of recovery that began in the spring of last year. All of the subsectors have lost ground, but especially capital goods, because its backlog of orders is at minus 63, a historic low. The index of finished goods stocks has worsened by 2 points to 24 above normal, a level not exceeded in more than a year. The worsening has not affected all subsectors, however, just intermediate goods, which have fallen four points, whereas capital and consumer goods are up three and five points, respectively. [Text] [Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish  
29 Sep-5 Oct 79 p 7] 8743

DECREASE IN TOURISM—As expected, significantly fewer tourists arrived in August of this year than in August of last year, specifically 1,221,671. Thus, the number of persons entering Spain over the first 8 months of the year totaled 28,150,841, down 1.5 percent from the same period in 1978. In itself this falloff would not be too important (last year's 40 million were perhaps too many) if it did not reflect what might be a more wideranging change. We must bear in mind that for years now, monthly tourist arrivals easily surpassed those of the previous year, except for circumstances such as Holy Week vacations occurring at different times. This tradition was broken last July, and as August developments confirm, this was not accidental. There are clear-cut reasons for this change, which might last for the entire so-called high season, at least...At first glance, the problem seems less serious if we keep in mind that even though fewer tourists came, foreign exchange income (at least that recorded as of July, the last

month for which data are available) was up almost 30 percent over the first 7 months of 1978. Now then, we also have to keep in mind that cumulative foreign exchange earnings as of late January were almost 60 percent higher than those of the same month last year and that this percentage has dropped steadily over the months to 50 in July. Of course optimists still have the consolation of pointing to so-called "quality tourism." [Text] [Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 29 Sep-5 Oct 79 p 7] 8743

CSO: 3110

**MAOISTS CHARGE VPK, APK HEAVILY SUBSIDIZED BY SOVIETS**

Stockholm GNISTAN in Swedish 14 Sep 79 pp 2, 3

/Article by Nils Funcke/

/Text/ The Left-Wing Communist Party (VPK) takes in almost four times as much money from Soviet orders for printed materials as it does from central membership dues.

This sensational discovery was made by GNISTAN's Nils Funcke, who has been investigating VPK's and APK's (Communist Labor Party) connections with the Soviet Union.

Västertalm, a VPK publishing house, gets 20 percent of its income from Moscow and Prague, according to its own as well as official reports.

Moscow's two sister parties in Sweden, VPK and APK, never receive any checks to be cashed from the Russian embassy. However, through visits and import arrangements, the parties transact business worth millions in terms of filling orders for printed materials from the Soviet Union.

In issue No 34 GNISTAN was able to report that the Soviet Union had placed a song and dance troop at APK's disposal for use as a drawing card at their meetings. However, APK is not the only party receiving economic benefits from the Soviet Union and the sister party there.

The VPK publishing house Västertalm Inc., which was granted more than 60,000 kronor in the party's budget from January to October 1979, receives 20 percent of its income from Moscow.

This is made possible in that the information department with the Soviet embassy allows its newspaper NEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION to be printed by Västertalm. According to a statement from the editor, the cost of producing the newspaper runs between 1.50 and 2 kronor per copy. Some 13,500 copies are printed and published 38 times a year.

The periodical "Internationell Revy--the Problem of Freedom and Socialism" is published by an international editorial staff with headquarters in Prague. The editor-in-chief is Russian, but VPK is part of the editorial management. Västervälm prints 1,000 copies of this periodical in Swedish, which are distributed four times a year. How much the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia, which are responsible for "Internationell Revy," pays Västervälm for these copies is a well-kept secret. According to the figures mentioned above, the VPI publishing house gets 809,500 to 1,086,00 kronor annually to print these copies.

The corporate register shows that Västervälm publishing house earned 4,418,732 kronor in 1978.

Up until 4 or 5 years ago, VPK's international secretary urban Karlsson ran a small import firms. He imported toys etc. at bottom price from Eastern countries and sold them to PVK organizations in charge of lotteries.

This business has now been taken over by KU, a Communist youth organization with headquarters in Göteborg. The corporation is registered under the name Kominkop. In 1977 its sales amounted to 299,931 kronor, primarily representing paper products and not lottery prizes, according to KU.

APK runs a store, Handelscentrum, in Jacobsgate in Stockholm where you can buy handicrafts, records etc. All the goods are imported from Eastern countries. APK board member Knut Tell manages the Tellimpex agency, which imports furniture from Romania and Poland. The company's board of directors are all Tell family members. The company was started in 1964 and, over the years, Tell has earned millions on his Russian contracts.

The Soviet Union is not only concerned about the sister parties' spiritual and financial welfare, but also party members' physical well-being.

Innumerable advertisements appear in NY DAG promoting vacation trips to the Soviet Union. Party members and sympathizers can spend a week in Leningrad and Moscow, "the revolution's cradle," including airfare from Stockholm and tourist class board and room for 1,525 kronor (as of November 1978). That also includes the cost of a passport, museum fees, train tickets and other incidentals.

In 1978, children of VPK members between 11 and 14 years of age could spend 3 weeks at a pioneer camp near the Black Sea for 1,200 to 1,300 kronor.

Nonparty members would have to pay approximately 1,900 kronor for the trip to Leningrad and 3,000 to 4,000 kronor for the Black Sea retreat, according to Nyman & Schultz travel agency.

Checking the issues of NY DAG for the last half of 1978, we found that party members had a chance to go on five different tours, all at reduced price.

In April this year a committee submitted a proposal concerning rules governing Sweden's safety and the support given to Swedish groups by foreign powers. Those who blocked a committee majority were Allan Hernelius (Conservative), Ake Polstam (Center) and Per Hilding, editor of GEFLE DAGBLAD. They demanded the reinstatement of an old paragraph in the criminal code which said "he who receives money or other rewards from a foreign power or anyone representing it to publish or spread writings or otherwise influence public opinion regarding the constitution or other matters concerning the kingdom's internal or external government will receive a prison term of up to 2 years for receiving foreign support."

The paragraph was removed from the criminal code by the Social Democrats and VPK to aid the lottery in the balanced Parliament in 1976 and became invalid 1 January 1978.

"I feel very uncomfortable about Swedish politicsl being manipulated by a foreign power," said Ake Polstam.

When GNISTAN reported that VPK and APK do business worth millions with the Soviet Union, Polstram said:

"I never thought this could be done. Without expressing myself about this particular case, it would be interesting to look into the matter further. Swedish politics must be Swedish," concluded Polstam.

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CSO: 3109

## BOURGEOIS PARTIES' MINISTERIAL CONTENDERS NAMED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 21 Sep 79 p 4

/Article by Claes-Goran Kjellander/

/Text/ Two of the most difficult problems in connection with a new three-party government will be the division of fiscal responsibility between the Department of Budget and Economy and Olof Johansson. The Conservatives will be in charge of the economy and Thorbjorn Falldin does not want to give up to Johansson.

Liberals and Conservatives have found it hard to forgive Johansson because, in their opinion, it was he who prevented the budget compromises a year ago.

However, the Center Party would find it absolutely unthinkable to sacrifice its newly elected vice chairman--he would have to be included, if only as minister of energy.

Do you recall the composition of the last three-party government?

Soder Must Choose

Thorbjorn Falldin was prime minister. He might come back, but it could also be his successor Ola Ullsten.

Karin Soder (Center) was minister of foreign affairs. Her involvement with the opposition on the Nuclear Energy Committee is working against her today. She must choose--the government or the committee. And she may choose another department. If Ullsten does not become prime minister, he could become minister of foreign affairs.

Ola Ullsten was assistant prime minister. If the new government wants a special assistant to the prime minister, that position could go to Olof Johansson (Center).

Rolf Wirten was minister of Labor. He holds that same position today and might keep it if the Liberal Party retains its representation. Otherwise, it could go to the Center Party. Margareta Ugglas (Conservative) could also become the minister of labor.

#### Minister of Justice (Conservative)

Sven Romanus (non-partisan) was and is the minister of justice. He will probably retire and be replaced by a Conservative--presumably Inger Lindqvist, Goteborg or possibly Hakan Winberg, Sundsvall.

Gosta Bohman (Conservative) was the minister of economy and Ingemar Mundebo was budget minister. In the present government, Personnel Minister Marianne Wahlberg (Liberal) sorts under the Department of Budget.

The Conservative Party is expected to demand the post of budget minister and that is evidently a trickier question to solve than agreeing on who should be prime minister.

It is unlikely that the Conservative leader will accept the heavy responsibility of preparing the national budget by himself. Ulf Adelsohn, public finance councillor in Stockholm, could be a suitable partner.

Adelsohn has proven his ability by containing spending in Stockholm. As a compromise, the Liberal Party should be able to retain the under secretary of that department, Sten Westerberg.

#### Asling in Charge of Energy?

Nils G. Asling (Center) was minister of industry and the Department of Industry also handled energy matters, with Olof Johansson (Center) as cabinet minister. There is no reason to appoint a special minister of energy beyond what the people voted for. If Asling becomes minister of industry, he can also take care of energy.

Jan-Erik Wikstrom (Liberal) was minister of education and Britt Mogard (Conservative) was minister of schools. Mogard will return and Wilstrom is also expected to return.

Rune Gustafsson was social minister and Ingegerd Troedsson was health care minister in the Department of Social Welfare. It is believed that neither of them will return. The two candidates for these posts are Borje Hornlund and Karin Soder (Center). At least one of the posts must go to the Conservatives. If Sven Johansson gives up his post as governor of Umea, he would be a strong candidate.

The Conservatives must also get one of the two cabinet ministerships in the Department of Housing. Georg Danell is one of the party's likely candidates for that post--if he and the present Minister of Housing Birgit Friggebo (Liberal) can agree on policy, they would be a good team.

## Dahlgren Returns

Anders Dahlgren (Center) will return to the Department of Agriculture, Staffan Burenstam Linder (Conservative) to the Department of Commerce and Eric Kronmark (Conservative) will presumably be back in the Defense Department. The Liberal Party will protest the latter appointment, but the Conservatives will not compromise their second vice chairman either.

The post of communications minister will go to the Conservatives. Ulf Adelsohn and Georg Danell are candidates for this post too, but Bo Turesson may return, in spite of the fact he is now leaving the Parliament.

The Liberal Party would like to retain the municipal and church ministership in order to extend its influence beyond Stockholm.

However, the Liberals are not likely to retain enough seats to keep Bertil Hansson from Goteborg. The Conservatives as well as the Center Party would like that post--Borje Hornlund and Karl Boo (Center) as well as Adelsohn (Conservative) are some topical names.

## Could Create More Posts

Through a variety of manipulations the government could, of course, create more ministerial posts independent of a department. Someone who is not appointed prime minister, for example, could become assistant prime minister without departmental responsibility.

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CSO: 3109

**SWEDEN EXPECTS GROWING NUMBER OF FINNISH GUEST WORKERS**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Sep 79 p 30

/Commentary by Bo Ericsson/

/Text/ We can expect a growing number of Finnish immigrant workers this fall as more jobs become available. However, significant changes are in the making with respect to the status of immigrants who come here hoping to find a job no longer will receive help from Swedish employment offices. Others changes affecting the direction and character of Swedish policies concerning the Finnish immigrant worker are being worked out.

There will be changes on several levels:

1. Swedish employment offices have taken a firm stand on so-called "spontaneous" immigrants, i.e., persons who arrive here without "official" recommendation from a Finnish employment office. They no longer automatically get a registration card from a Swedish employment office. Without that card they cannot get a job with any of the major companies, which, as a rule, have agreed not to hire immigrants who are not registered with an employment office.

Tougher Line

Without a registration card, "the spontaneous immigrant" must try to get a job by himself or go back to Finland where he can try to get work in Sweden through a Finnish employment office.

The reason for enforcing this tougher line is that new job openings must now first be channeled to a large number of job seekers who were left out in the last few years--including immigrants who did not find a job earlier. At least employment offices in Stockholm and Goteborg have noted a reduction in the number of "spontaneous" immigrants, while more people are looking for jobs through official channels.

2. Labor unions have also taken a firmer stand, partly by demanding that immigration, in general, be better organized and partly through more direct efforts to influence the situation from day to day: Local unions have been urged to make sure that job openings this fall first be offered to locally unemployed persons and not to new immigrants.

#### Security Clause

3. A 35-year old free Scandinavian labor market agreement serves as the guideline. Finland is now demanding that a security clause be added to this agreement. In practice, the implication thereof would be that prospective immigrants not only need to have secured a job but also have found a place to live before moving to Sweden. In order to have that kind of security, immigration should be arranged through an employment office. Up to now, most Finns have immigrated without the aid of a Finnish employment office.

4. Beginning in October, Finnish job seekers will get a free trip to Sweden. The Swedish Government will pay travel expenses for Finns who are interested in a job and want to come and check out job openings here. In order to qualify for such a trip a person must be unemployed or threatened with unemployment and, furthermore, there can be no other applicants for a particular job in Sweden.

Conversely, Finns in Sweden can travel at the expense of the Finnish Government to check out job openings in their native country.

These measures have two common denominators:

- \* there must be more security connected with these moves and
- \* immigration must be regulated so that new job openings can first be offered to locally unemployed persons, even if they are not the most attractive help as far as the company is concerned.

The latter denominator is at least partly connected with the fact that most of the immigrants from Finland today are young and often well educated--i.e. competitive. To a greater extent than before, they come from the Helsingfors area and industrialized sections of Finland. There is no longer the large share of immigrants from sparsely populated districts in Finland.

#### Some 380,000 Immigrants

Since the introduction of the free Scandinavian labor market in 1954, more than 380,000 Finns have moved to Sweden. The majority of them still remain here.

During the early seventies in the influx from Finland decreased--even reversed itself for a few years. But that was a temporary phenomenon. Last year almost 12,000 Finns immigrated to Sweden. Less than half that number returned to Finland after living here for some time.

This year's figure will depend on developments during the next few months. Right now there is a great demand for workers in many industries. Industrial concerns as well as employment offices report a greatly increased number of applications from Finland.

Finns have learned of job openings in Sweden again from relatives and friends who spent their vacation in Finland.

Today a number of major companies have so many job openings that they have sent delegations as far as Norbotten and Varmland to recruit workers.

To be sure, Finland is also in an economic upswing--industry is doing well--but, based on experience, it is not the increase or decrease in Finnish unemployment that determines the immigration westward, but rather the availability of jobs in Sweden (and the higher wages).

"The immigration pressure has been building in this country and now this pressure can be released," said Johann Lonnroth with the Ministry of Labor in Finland. "What we want to do now is not to block increased immigration across the Gulf of Bothnia, but to make immigrants more secure."

#### More Advertising

The obvious increase in job advertisements in Finnish newspapers lately is another sign of Sweden's demand for workers. Most of the advertising is done by smaller companies which are not aware that such advertising violates agreements between Sweden and Finland.

They became quite irritated in Finland a few weeks ago when a group of people from Olofstrom and the county council arranged a meeting in Helsingfors to inform Finns about job openings in the medical field in Sweden.

Saab-Scania in Sodertalje is one of the companies that need more workers today. The company says it is receiving a growing number of applications from Finland right now. "But", says a company spokesman, "we are not actively trying to recruit people from Finland. Nevertheless, we do get applicants."

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**STRUGGLE WITHIN SWEDISH OIL MARKET INCREASING**

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Sep 79 p 25

/Commentary by Richard Plate/

/Text/ The structure of the Swedish oil market is undergoing a violent change. Government-owned Svenska Petroleum has invested hundreds of millions to strengthen its position and will have sales in excess of 3 billion kronor this year. At the same time, other companies are on the way out.

This has been a rapid development pressured by the instability of the international market. Since a number of established oil companies explained late last spring or early summer they would not be able to maintain normal deliveries due to Swedish price policies, Svenska Petroleum has increased its efforts to be the first to secure crude oil deliveries.

**Supply Exceeding Demand**

Today we find that Svenska Petroleum (SP) has been so successful in their efforts that the company now has a greater supply of crude oil than it actually needs. Svenska Petroleum concluded one of its latest oil contracts when it secured some Nigerian oil following the nationalization of BP's holdings in that country.

This is the background against which we must view SP's attempt to secure refining facilities. The first step in that direction was the joint venture with Svenska BP, which allows SP to refine one million tons annually in Goteborg.

**Scanraff Secured**

The agreement with OK-Texaco concerning the development of Scanraff to provide 17 percent refining of up to 10 million tons annually has also been secured. Nothing has been published with respect to each company's investment in this development. However, it should not be very difficult to arrive at the approximate figures.

It did not cost much to develop Scanraff's capacity to handle 10 million tons annually. Hence, we can estimate the development costs to be around 1800 million kronor. The refinery's book value has been reduced by about 30 percent. Figuring 17 percent of the remaining value--the share purchased--we arrive at a sum of just over 200 million kronor. In any event, SP did not commit itself to pay more than that.

#### BP's Investment Less

Calculating Svenska BP's investment in the same manner, we get a lower figure. The refinery is older and SP's investment in it is less. It is likely that SP did not pay more than 100 million kronor. Therefore, the total investment should be somewhere around 300 million kronor.

The terms of SP's most recent agreement with Finnish Neste Oy about refining three million tons of crude oil over 2 years can be expected to be in SP's favor. Neste has not been able to utilize its refining capacity for some time and, therefore, the agreement with SP is to its advantage.

#### Violent Opposition

These developments all point to the fact that Svenska Petroleum is on the road to becoming a power factor within the Swedish oil market. Reactions differ among the established oil companies. BP and OK-Texaco are going along with SP, while some of the other companies are in violent opposition.

SP director Sture Agvald is being pressured from two sides. We should mention, for example, that at a Petroleum Institute board meeting--the branch organization--things were stormy. There Agvald was told that a government-owned company has no business in the oil market. At an SP board meeting, a board member explained he had no intentions of checking into the company's business, but wanted rather to investigate the political dministration.

As far as we can judge, SP is following a strict commercial course. Board Chairman and envoy Arne S. Lundberg undoubtedly has a lot to do with that. Hence, we can also assume that SP will not support OK's attempt to arrange a billion kronor investment in a "cracker" by political means--converting heavy oil into lighter oil--at Scanraff. SP thinks we have sufficient capacity to produce gasoline in Sweden.

Major companies that are most intensively involved in fighting SP are Esso, Gulf, Shell and Nynas. Of these, Esso is obviously given to loose some of its share of the market, while Shell's position is more difficult to infringe upon. Nynas' primary intention is probably to sell to the government, in spite of company denials.

Nynas has repeatedly shown great negotiating skill. During the 1973-74 oil crisis, a government clearing fund was established to compensate products' purchases, but not spot market crude oil. By and by Nynas managed to get "clearing" for crude oil as well from the then Social Democratic government.

When Nynas early last summer publicized reports of its heavy losses due to Swedish price policies and what effects that would have on employment, SVENSKA DAGBLADET learned from government sources that Nynas was not out to do business. They simply wanted government compensation for the losses. However, the political will to do so was lacking.

The present situation is not clear. Contacts have been made between Nynas and Svenska Petroleum, but they have not led to anything. A few months ago Nynas announced it would cut deliveries due to a shortage of products and Svenska Petroleum took over instead.

Nynas later complained to the government and pointed out that SP has 3 to 5-year contracts. What they wanted the government to do was to guarantee that Nynas would get its former customers back as soon as the company was able to deliver again. Such guarantees have not been forthcoming.

As of now, no offer or counter offer has been made. A centrally located source told SVENSKA DAGBLADET that the negotiations are characterized by a lack of alternatives. However, it seems clear that SP will not take over Nynas. The refinery as well as the distribution apparatus are considered worn out.

#### Has Own Oil Harbor

Of course, Nynas does not agree with that judgment. Nynashamn refinery is indeed old, but functioning. What they actually want could be to reactivate the idea of investing a billion kronor in a new Nynashamn. Naturally, the company would not pay for it.

Using government money, the refinery would be constructed on property owned or leased by Nynas. The project would receive favor because of an existing oil harbor and some storage possibilities. However, Nynas Petroleum ownership is another question.

The idea of a refinery in Nynashamn is a recurring one. An investment of approximately 1 billion kronor would be required to build a competitive facility. The government's interest in the project can be described as lukewarm, at best. The image of large crude oil tanks making their way into Nynashamn does not help the situation.

One of Nynas' other contacts should be of greater interest to the future of the Swedish oil market. Nynas has been discussing a number of questions, including distribution, with Norsk Hydro. Whatever happens in future discussions, we are likely to see a Norwegian involvement.

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## MEMBER OF THE TCP'S POLITBURO INTERVIEWED BY 'FRANCE NOUVELLE'

Paris FRANCE NOUVELLE in French 8-14 Sep 79 pp 18,19

[Interview of Ahmet Saydan by Roger Trugnan in French Communist Party weekly, date and place not given: "Questions to a Leader of the Clandestine Communist Party"]

[Text] [Question] Three years ago you had come to Paris for a meeting similar to the one which has just finished. Since then, many things have happened to Turkey. Can you tell us how you perceive this period?

[Answer] Indeed, important events have taken place since 1976. The crisis has become so much more serious that the government can no longer run the country by, shall we say, the usual means. It relies on the demagogery of social reformism, and, at the same time, on fascist aggression, state of siege conditions and violations of fundamental liberties.

If I have a good memory, I was saying in an interview for L'HUMANITE 3 years ago that only a policy opposed to the schemes of imperialism and monopolies, a democratic policy of peace and disarmament, could bring the country out of this impasse. That is not the way which has been chosen: Externally, links with imperialism have been strengthened, which has brought about a sharpening of our problems, increased terrorism and successive new leases on the state of siege.

Turkey is the typical example of countries that collapse because of their economic, political and military submission to imperialism. Since 1976 the foreign debt has reached \$20 billion. The deficit of public finances is becoming chronic. That of foreign commerce has increased, in 1978 alone, by \$5 billion.

[Question] But there has been a change of government?

[Answer] That's true. Three years ago the coalition in power was rightist with fascist leanings. At the elections of October 1977 the Republican Party of the People, a group in the opposition belonging to the Socialist International, was very nearly in the majority in the assembly. There were some positive elements in its program: a critique of rightist politics,

some social measures and even some anti-imperialist positions. With the support of a few deputies of the Party of Justice who had resigned, the Republican Party of the People finally succeeded in forming a government.

This government, directed by Mr Ecevit for the last 18 months, has kept none of its promises. While Mr Ecevit has declared that the USSR does not constitute a danger for Turkey--of which a majority of the citizens is convinced--he agreed, under pressure from NATO, to increase the armament budget by \$100 million. In exchange for a loan of \$1.5 billion we also accepted the conditions of the European Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the OECD: devaluation, higher prices, lower wages, five percent limitations on investments and on the rate of growth, and--to crown it all--a commission from OECD to control the application of these measures! All this is certainly associated with an increased dependence on imperialism.

[Question] Have the changes in Iran had repercussions in Turkey?

[Answer] Undoubtedly. Thus, on the strategic plane, Turkey is becoming an even more essential part of the imperialist dispositions in the region.

On the other hand, the reaction of the government and of the most reactionary milieus has been to reinforce terror and oppression against the Kurdish people. Common military dispositions have been taken with Iraq to combat the Kurdish national liberation movement. In eastern Anatolia the forces of the army and the constabulary have been considerably increased.

Events in Iran contain a lesson, of course. That a great popular movement should have gotten the better of the despotic regime of the shah, and that, consequently, U.S. bases should have lost the "impregnable view" that they had into Soviet territory--these represent an undoubted success for the revolutionary forces, and are a sign of their unity. But we should clearly see that problems do not take the same form in Turkey. We are neighbors of Iran, we have a long historical past in common, but we have not followed the same political and social itinerary. For instance, religion does not have the same impact with us. This does not mean that there are no problems on that plane. Rightist politicians always try to use religious beliefs in and obscurantist sense to bring about acceptance of a regime of exploitation and to assure for itself an electoral base. Our own party, together with other progressive currents, denounces these hypocritical attitudes, and educates the workers, whether they are believers or not, on the necessity of placing themselves within the context of the class struggle.

[Question] On this point, what can be said about the actual struggle?

[Answer] With certain peculiarities, in Turkey as in other capitalist countries, the essential support of the evolution of society toward progress and revolutionary changes lies with the working class. One finds it in the vanguard of democratic and anti-imperialist struggles. Such was the case with the 1st of May celebrations, the power of which was due to the mobilization of the working class, which involves the masses of democrats and patriots.

One of the last demonstrations took place last 30 June in Izmir, on the initiative of the Association for Peace. Need I say that communist militants contributed to it actively? About 50 organizations supported it, and thousands of manual and intellectual workers participated: trade unionists, members of the legal socialist parties, members of youth and women's unions... In fact, one could find there a realization of a national democratic front--an objective proposed by our party. And the slogans illustrated aspirations which are widely shared: "No to NATO;" "American bases off our lands!" "We want an independent Turkey!" "We will not be policemen against our neighbors!"

It is against the working class that the Right concentrates all its blows. It hopes to deprive it of its vanguard by maintaining the Turkish Communist Party in clandestinity. But there are many slips from the cup to the lips. In spite of very difficult conditions, repressions and fascist aggressions, the TCP is at the threshold of a new phase of its activities among the masses. It occupies a place in the political life of the country, this is now acknowledged publically, and it is the result of the workers' struggle.

The adversary is trying to liquidate the militant unions. Ecevit and his social democratic friends have taken up a struggle against the DISK and its conception of independent unions, of masses and classes. They have succeeded, by vile maneuvering, in capturing the leadership. But they have not succeeded in altering the workers' will to fight. Thus, the new leaders have been pushed out of their responsibilities in their own unions and find themselves without support at the base!

It is important to note that the action of the working class for its demands, for democracy and socialism, is not without influence--and increasingly so--on rural workers, the lower middle classes, and also on that fraction of the bourgeoisie whose interests are opposed to those of imperialism.

[Question] The Communist Party can therefore broadcast its objectives with a certain audience?

[Answer] Absolutely. I want to say first of all--this is no revelation--that we propose to open the way to socialism for our people. We have a precise, democratic program, which takes into account the interests of the workers and of all the toiling masses. We intend to overcome the crisis, which has particularly brutal consequences in Turkey; to put an end to the power of big capital and landed property, the allies of imperialism, and to hasten the revolutionary process.

Our party is acting to unite on a common platform all the forces which have an objective interest in change. We have launched the idea of a national democratic front in order to achieve a wide popular gathering, for action. A few steps have been taken, but it is still cautious. Some of the leaders of legal socialist parties react in a negative manner, purely out of anti-communist. The same holds true of some Maoist groups, which make a lot of noise and are not without some material means. They claim to be "among those who continue the works of Marx," directing their blows exclusively against

the TCP and publicly denouncing communist militants for reprisals by  
fascist commandos!

This having been said, our party is not and will not allow itself to be  
deflected from its goal. We want union, we want action to develop the  
popular movement. That is the only way to success.

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